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Abstract
The current stagnation of Turkish democracy goes hand in hand with 
the current impasse in EU-Turkey relations. A combination of domestic 
factors with a loss of credibility of EU conditionality led to a situation 
in which political reform is substantially stalled and in cases where it 
is realised, it is mostly conducted to serve the interests of the ruling 
political elite and with no real reference to the EU. The virtuous cycle of 
reform that characterised the 1999-2005 period has been replaced by 
a vicious cycle in which lack of effective conditionality feeds into po-
litical stagnation which in turn moves Turkey and the EU further away 
from one another.
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Introduction
Back in August 2004, we published a working paper on the role of 
Turkey’s relations with the EU in transforming Turkish democracy 
as part of a larger project on EU-Turkey relations conducted by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Economics and 
Foreign Policy Forum (Aydın and Keyman 2004). The central argument 
of the paper was that the strengthening credibility of EU conditionality 
towards Turkey, coupled with favourable domestic and international 
dynamics resulted in substantial reforms towards the consolidation 
of Turkish democracy. The paper, written prior to the EU’s decision to 
open accession negotiations with Turkey, concluded that the opening 
of accession talks with the country on the basis of a fair decision that 
rests on Turkey’s achievements in its modernity and democracy would 
constitute a crucial step in remedying the remaining problematic 
aspects of Turkish democracy. 
Almost eight years after writing that paper, a lot has changed in 
EU-Turkey relations as well as in the state of Turkish democracy. The 
EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 
upon the Commission’s assessment that Turkey sufficiently fulfils 
the Copenhagen political criteria, but since then progress has been 
very slow. By the end of August 2012, Turkey had provisionally closed 
only one negotiating chapter (science and research) and opened 12 
more out of a total of 35 chapters. As for the consolidation of Turkish 
democracy, there is general agreement that the reform process has 
substantially slowed down since 2005, with acute problems remaining 
in various areas such as minority rights, fundamental freedoms (in 
particular the freedom of expression) and the judicial system. In fact, 
as Turkey came closer to the EU with the accession talks, the Progress 
Reports paradoxically became longer and more critical. Even when 
reforms are undertaken, such as in the case of the rights of non-
Muslim minorities, civil-military relations or the judicial system, they 
are not carried out with a view to acceding to the EU. If any external 
factor is mentioned in justifying reform, it is the global environment 
and globalisation that are viewed as the drivers of reform, not the EU. 
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While the Turkish economy has tripled its size over the decade and 
grew close to 10% last year, with a corresponding rise in activism 
in its foreign policy, a mismatch has begun to be seen between its 
economic and foreign policy performance and the state of Turkish 
democracy. At the end of two more consecutive victories at the 
polls by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in 2007 and 
2011, attempts to consolidate Turkish democracy have begun to be 
replaced by steps towards a highly centralised executive democracy in 
which the state still holds primacy over society. It is true that the AKP 
took important steps in democratic reform primarily in its first term 
in office, moving the country towards starting accession negotiations 
with the EU. While some progress was achieved in areas such as civil-
military relations, the AKP’s second term in government also started to 
bear witness to growing authoritarian tendencies on the part of the 
governing party, resulting in restrictions on fundamental freedoms 
such as the freedom of expression. Questions continued on the issue 
of judicial independence, even among those who advocated for the 
“yes” campaign during the constitutional referendum that aimed to 
restructure the judicial system (see the section on the judicial system). 
Attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue were halted and replaced 
by Turkish nationalism, resulting in the escalation of the conflict in 
the southeast. To borrow Steven Cook’s phrase, while the AKP was 
trying to “govern” through reform rather than rule in its early years 
in government, it is currently “ruling” but not “governing”, whereby 
its dominance of the political system does not translate into good 
governance as required in a consolidated democracy (Cook 2007). 
This paper first outlines the general background of the stagnation in 
Turkish democracy in the post-2005 period, with a particular focus 
on the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic factors that 
hinder political reform. It then focuses on the problems and prospects 
that exist in consolidating Turkish democracy by paying particular 
attention to the role of the military, the state of human rights, the 
protection of minorities and the judicial system. The paper concludes 
that despite the currently troubled relationship between Turkey 
and the EU, the post-2005 trajectory of democratic reform in Turkey 
demonstrates that the EU remains a much needed fundamental 
anchor in the consolidation of Turkish democracy.
External constraints and domestic factors: the 
trajectory of post-2005 democratic reform in Turkey
The Europeanization literature identifies two EU-level factors as critical 
for successful EU conditionality in democratic consolidation - sizable 
and credible incentives (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). The 
EU has offered Turkey the maximum stimulus it is able to offer - full 
EU membership upon meeting accession requirements. Indeed, 
as elaborated in depth in our 2004 paper, EU incentives played an 
important role in Turkey’s democratic reform when the credibility of 
conditionality was relatively high between 1999 and 2005 - a time 
period spanning the granting of candidacy status in 1999, followed by 
the promise of launching accession negotiations in 2002 (on condition 
that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria) and the opening 
of accession negotiations in 2005. For instance, more than half of all 
the constitutional amendments in judicial reform undertaken since 
the adoption of the 1982 Constitution took place between 1999 and 
2005 (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 2012: 67). Yet, the credibility of the 
EU’s offer has been questioned heavily after the opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey in 2005. 
Triggered by the rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands, the EU’s “absorption capacity” quickly 
became a key element of the debate on Turkey’s accession in 2005 
(Emerson et al. 2006). This concept has, in fact, been on the table since 
the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, which stated in its conclusions that 
“the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is […] an important consideration 
in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries” 
(European Council 1993: 13). In the previous enlargement round, it 
was actually treated as a “consideration” that calls upon the EU itself to 
reform rather than a formal criterion of accession. Applied to Turkey, 
however, the debate focused upon Turkey itself, and particularly its 
unchanging and unchangeable features: its size, population, culture, 
and unpopularity with the EU citizens, conveying the message that, 
unlike the Eastern enlargement, complying with the formal criteria 
alone may not be sufficient for Turkey’s full accession to the Union. 
The concept was subsequently incorporated into the Negotiating 
Framework for Turkey which stated that “while having full regard to all 
Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, 
if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of 
membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the 
European structures through the strongest possible bond” (European 
Commission 2005b: para. 2).
This phrase invited a reflection on alternative scenarios to membership 
such as a “privileged partnership” proposed by German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and resulted in the addition of the “absorption 
capacity” to the Copenhagen criteria. Furthermore, the Negotiating 
Framework for Croatia, adopted on the same day and drafted in 
almost identical language, omitted this phrase while only referring 
to “absorption capacity” as “an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and Croatia” (European Commission 
2005a: para. 16). In the same way, the Negotiating Framework for 
Turkey included other provisions that were absent from the text on 
Croatia, such as “permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which 
are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures […] in 
areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies 
or agriculture” (European Commission 2005b: para. 12). This was the 
first time that permanent derogations were being introduced in the 
EU’s enlargement policy, suggesting to the Turkish elite and public 
that a “second-class membership” was being envisaged for Turkey. It 
also coincided with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel 
and their wide-reaching statements on the undesirability of Turkish 
accession. In fact, upon Sarkozy’s coming to power in 2007, the French 
government blocked negotiations on five chapters of the acquis on 
the grounds that the chapters were directly linked to full membership. 
Another crucial factor that has hampered conditionality in the case of 
Turkey is the Cyprus conflict. Upon the approval of the UN sponsored 
Annan Plan by the Turkish Cypriots and its rejection by the Greek 
Cypriots in the April 2004 referenda, the Council declared that it was 
“determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community” (European Council 2004: 9). The comprehensive package 
of aid and trade measures proposed by the Commission in July 
2004 was however left largely unimplemented due to strong Greek 
Cypriot resistance in the Council (ICG 2006: 12-13). Nevertheless, the 
EU continued to pressure Turkey to open its seaports and airspace 
to Greek Cyprus as required by Turkey’s customs union agreement 
with the EU. Turkey, in turn, refused to comply on the grounds that 
no steps had been taken to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. 
In December 2006, the Council decided not to open negotiations on 
eight chapters of the acquis relevant to the issue1  and not to close any 
of the chapters provisionally until Turkey met its obligations towards 
Cyprus. This has, to a large extent, served to block progress in accession 
negotiations and substantially fed into the perceptions in Turkey that 
the country is being treated unfairly, with the EU using Cyprus as a tool 
to block Turkey’s accession (Öniş 2009: 7).
This was clearly reflected in the surveys designed to gauge the 
attitudes of the Turkish public towards the EU and the accession 
process. These suggest that public support for Turkey’s EU accession 
remained considerably high until the second half of 2005. Support for 
EU membership rose significantly after the Helsinki Summit from 62% 
in 1998 to 74% in 1999 and to 75% in 2001. Support levels stabilised at 
around 70% between 2002 and the second half of 2004, a period that 
coincided with the ascendancy of the AKP into power and the relative 
1 The suspension includes the chapters on the free movement of goods, right 
of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture 
and rural development, fisheries, customs union, transport policy, and external 
relations. 
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strengthening of the credibility of EU conditionality.2  
Figure 1 (in the Annex) summarises the Eurobarometer data from 2004 
to 2011.3  The data suggests that from the second half of 2004 onwards 
(with slight exceptions in 2006, 2009 and 2010), the Turkish public 
increasingly found EU membership as not necessarily a good thing. By 
the first half of 2011, support levels fell to 41%. The most rapid decline 
was from 55% in the second half of 2005 to 44% in the first half of 
2006. This coincided with the period in which the absorption capacity 
debates became popular in Europe, the negotiating framework with its 
emphasis on “open ended negotiations” and “permanent derogations” 
was drafted and the first concrete signs that the Cyprus issue would 
have a substantial impact on accession negotiations appeared.4  
Previous research found that attitudes towards EU membership 
in Turkish society are largely dependent on individuals’ utilitarian 
evaluations (hence the expected impact of EU membership on their 
lives) and the likelihood of Turkey becoming a member of the EU 
(Kentmen 2008; Çarkoğlu 2003). In relation to that, the Turkish public 
ranks economic welfare and the freedom to travel, work and study 
in the EU among the top two signifiers of EU accession (European 
Commission 2009a). Furthermore, in a national survey conducted 
in 2006, two thirds of the respondents expressed disbelief in Turkey 
ever becoming a member of the EU (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 
127). Hence it can be argued that the strong possibility of imposing 
permanent limits on the free movement of people and on the full 
enjoyment of EU funds, coupled with the decreasing expectation of 
full membership, had a significant negative impact on levels of Turkish 
support for EU accession. This in turn implies that EU conditionality has 
for some time now been facing a lack of societal legitimacy in Turkey, 
whereby Turkish citizens are becoming increasingly estranged from 
the European project. The danger that this holds for democratic reform 
is that it reduces the incentive for the adoption of costly reforms to 
attain EU accession, ties down the hands of domestic reformers and 
thus also undermines the power of the Union as an effective external 
anchor for democratic reform in Turkey. 
In the case of  Turkey, the low degree of societal legitimacy also affects the 
democratic norms promoted through EU conditionality. The popular 
legitimacy of externally promoted democratic norms has been found 
in the past to be one of the key ingredients of successful democratic 
conditionality by the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). 
Nonetheless, societal attitudes towards democracy in Turkey tend to 
display a mixed picture in terms of their conduciveness to democratic 
consolidation. On the one hand, a large majority of the public seems to 
support democracy as a regime type. A study published in 2007 found 
that 77% of those surveyed indicated democracy as the best regime 
type (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2007: 55). However, a more recent study 
conducted in 2011 also found that those who agree or strongly agree 
with the assertion that “democracy can sometimes be compromised to 
restore order and security” amount in total to 44.8% of those surveyed 
(Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 21). The latter study also puts forward 
other indicators which point out that order and stability is generally 
valued highly, often more so than fundamental rights and freedoms or 
the right of representation among Turkish public opinion. For instance, 
41.9% of those surveyed agree with the assertion that political parties 
can be shut down while 48.5% stated their preference to retain the 
exceptionally high 10% electoral threshold for political parties to enter 
into Parliament (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 18, 20). 
2 See European Commission, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001 (Autumn 2001), 
2003.2 (Spring 2003) and 2003.4 (Autumn 2003); Standard Eurobarometer No. 62 
(Autumn 2004) and Turkey’s National Report in Standard Eurobarometer No. 63 (Spring 
2005). 
3 See also European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer Nos. 71 (Spring 2009), 72 
(Autumn 2009), 73 (Spring 2010), 74 (Autumn 2010) and 75 (Spring 2011). 
4 In September 2005, just before the launch of the accession negotiations, the Council 
issued a declaration reminding Turkey that the EU and its member states “expect full, 
non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol” to all EU member 
states and that “[f ]ailure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall 
progress in the negotiations” (European Council 2005: para. 3).
Equally problematic is the level of tolerance in Turkish society, as a key 
element of democratic consolidation that cross-cuts almost all sub-
areas of democratic reform. For instance, the same study found that 
17.8% of those surveyed asserted that they would feel uncomfortable 
living with Kurds (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 20). Other studies 
reached similar conclusions. In their study on conservatism in Turkey, 
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu found that 68% of the Turkish population 
rank higher than 50 (where the scale runs from 0 intolerance to 100) 
in their political intolerance scale (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 50-
54). Around 62% of respondents argued that minority views should 
not be tolerated, a similar majority supported the view that freedom 
of speech could be curtailed for certain political groups, an even 
higher majority (64%) did not tolerate peaceful demonstrations by 
extremist groups and 57% believed that newspapers did not have the 
right to publish articles that are “against national interests” (Çarkoğlu 
and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 51). On specific liberties, another study found 
that while 43% are in favour of the abolition of the headscarf ban in 
universities, only 11.4% of the public seem to support the right to 
education in Kurdish (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2007: 27). Read together, 
these and other data point at the prevailing existence of a “sectarian” 
understanding of democracy in Turkish society, where the rights of 
those that are perceived as one of “us” are upheld while the rights of 
those denoted as “others” are disregarded. Needless to say, this runs 
counter to the nature of the democratic reforms that the EU demands 
from Turkey, which first and foremost require the country to undertake 
a substantial shift from a monolithic conception of the “nation” to one 
that is inclusive of diversity. 
One can argue that these societal trends are not new. Yet, they have 
recently been compounded by an increasing degree of political and 
societal polarisation along the axis of the Islamist-secularist divide as 
well as that of Turkish-Kurdish nationalism, which makes it exceedingly 
difficult to undertake democratic reform through societal deliberation 
(Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009). This polarisation is acutely visible at 
both the public and the elite level. For instance both the 2007 and 
2011 elections as well as the Constitutional Referendum in 2010 
were fought in highly polarised (and personalised) political contexts 
(Aydın-Düzgit 2012; Çarkoğlu 2007; Kalaycıoğlu 2011). At the societal 
level, public views on key issues of democratic consolidation are now 
largely divided along and determined by partisan lines. For instance, 
on a 1 to 10 scale that measures satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy in Turkey, those who have voted for the AKP were found 
to score on average 6.6 whereas the degree of satisfaction with 
democracy among those who voted for the main opposition party, 
the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was found to be on average 
2.9 (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 14). The same study found that 
among those who stated that freedom of expression exists for writers 
and journalists, 55.6% had voted for the AKP while only 19.6% were 
reported to be CHP voters (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011: 15).
These societal trends became more forceful hindrances to democratic 
consolidation when combined with another key domestic variable: 
the differential empowerment of political actors. The differential 
empowerment of political elites through EU accession incentives can 
account for the pace and direction of political reform in candidate 
countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudová 2005). 
In other words, where and when domestic political actors seize the 
opportunities arising from the EU’s conditional offer of membership in 
line with the predictions of rational choice institutionalism, democratic 
institutional change occurs. This has also been the case in the Turkish 
context, where the AKP, upon coming to power in 2002, successfully 
promoted EU accession and its democratic reform agenda to widen 
its support base towards the centre. The party attempted to preserve 
its core constituency through promise of extended religious freedoms 
and to guarantee its survival vis-à-vis the secularist state establishment 
in the judiciary and the military (Özel 2003).
Especially after its second electoral victory in 2007, the AKP became 
much stronger both in society and against the secularist establishment, 
and thus became less dependent on the EU and its democratisation 
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agenda (Öniş 2009: 9). The reactions of the government to the 
recently intensified EU criticisms of the state of democracy in Turkey 
are indicative of the weakened reliance on the EU. In response to the 
critical report of the European Parliament on Turkey published in March 
2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the “Parliament is entrusted 
to draft the Report and we are entrusted to do as we see fit” (Milliyet 
Daily 2011). In addition to the increased strength and confidence of 
the government, the EU’s decreasing societal legitimacy as an external 
actor has contributed to this indifference. To a question on why the 
2010 constitutional referendum was not justified in terms of Turkey’s 
EU accession, the Minister of EU Affairs and the Chief Negotiator 
Egemen Bağış replied that “the EU does not make the news anymore, 
the EU does not sell” (Bağış 2010).
This has had two main implications for democratic change in Turkey. 
First, despite the weakening EU anchor, the relative strength of the 
government has facilitated the pursuit of further reform in some areas, 
most notably in strengthening civilian control over the military, which 
largely stood in opposition to the government. However, the relative 
weakness of the opposition, the dwindling of the EU anchor and the 
sectarian views on democracy among the public have also made it 
easier to undertake more selective democratic reforms according to 
the government’s interests. For example, while civil-military relations 
are being reformed (see below), the government still chooses to 
retain some of the infamous remnants of the 1980 coup (and ensuing 
constitution), such as the High Education Board (YÖK) through which 
it exercises significant control over universities. A similar situation 
can also be found in the more specific area of judicial reform. The 
government, especially during its second term, has had conflictual 
relations with the largely oppositional Kemalist judiciary, culminating 
in the closure case against the AKP in March 2008. In August 2009, 
the government announced the Judicial Reform Strategy and put 
its main provisions to referendum in 2010. The amendments aimed 
to democratise the judiciary and make it more responsive to the 
demands of society by diversifying the background of the members 
of the Constitutional Court and widening the composition of the High 
Council that determines the career paths of judges and prosecutors. 
But the amendments were criticised mainly for retaining substantial 
provisions that compromise judicial independence, and a number of 
incidents in the years that have followed suggest that these fears were 
not completely unfounded (see also below). 
Another domestic constraint on the post-2005 period concerns the 
rise of PKK violence. It is well known that the lower the political costs 
that are associated with compliance/rule adoption, the easier it is for 
EU conditionality to bear full fruit (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). The 
political cost of compliance with democratic reforms, particularly 
regarding the Kurdish issue, was lowered at the end of the 1990s with 
the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the military defeat of 
the PKK. The window of opportunity that opened then allowed for 
significant reforms that directly aimed at improving the lives of Kurds 
in the country, such as the granting of the right to broadcast in Kurdish, 
to learn the Kurdish language and use Kurdish names. Nonetheless, 
largely thanks to political instability in Iraq, the PKK renewed its terrorist 
activities in 2005, intensifying in 2007 and pushing the government 
into taking military action against the PKK bases in Northern Iraq in 
February 2008. Violence continued up until the 2011 general elections 
and has been compounded since then with developments in Turkey’s 
southern neighbourhood, where the PKK has recently found refuge in 
the political vacuum opened by the Syrian civil war.
The renewal and rise of PKK terrorism enhances the nationalist fervour 
among the public and political parties, hindering substantial reform 
particularly in the field of minority rights (see also the section on 
minority rights). It also demonstrates the close interconnectedness 
between Turkish foreign policy and the state of its democracy. As its 
ties with the EU have weakened, Turkey’s links with the Middle East 
have grown. This has generally been welcomed as a positive step 
that could result in Turkey acting as a European power promoting 
democracy in its neighbourhood. However it has also displayed 
the limits of Turkey’s “demonstrative effect” (Kirişçi 2011b), given the 
resilience of Turkey’s Kurdish issue and the need for Turkey to practice 
what it preaches in order to remain a credible actor and to prevent 
the escalation of its own ethnic conflict to the intensity of those in its 
immediate neighbourhood.
Against this background, the next section discusses the state of 
reform and the remaining problems in four key areas of democratic 
consolidation: the military, human rights, the protection of minorities 
and the judicial system.
Civil-military relations
Substantial steps were undertaken to realign civil-military relations 
in Turkey between 1999 and 2005 when reform zeal was at its peak. 
As outlined in further detail in our previous paper, reforms in this 
period particularly concerned those areas that were specified clearly 
by the EU, such as the powers of the National Security Council 
(NSC), the presence of military representatives on public bodies, and 
the transparency and control of the military budget. With the 2001 
constitutional amendments, the sixth and seventh harmonisation 
packages, and the May 2004 constitutional amendments, a number 
of fundamental changes were made to the duties, functioning and 
composition of the NSC, as well as to the conditions relating to the 
monitoring of military spending.
The pace of reform declined after 2005, only to pick up after 2010 
following key domestic developments. As the country approached 
the presidential and general elections in 2007, the military became 
increasingly willing to step out in protest against several EU officials’ 
statements and the overall policy drive to establish complete civilian 
control over the military. This reached a peak after the last-minute 
nomination of Abdullah Gül as the AKP’s candidate for the presidency. 
The main critique directed at the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan 
in the run-up to the presidential elections was the way in which no 
consensual agreement mechanisms were sought with the opposition 
and civil society, with the aim of selecting a candidate accepted by a 
large segment of Turkish society. The fact that Gül himself was a major 
figure of the National Outlook movement from the days of the Welfare 
Party and that his election would introduce the headscarf in the top 
public office in Turkey, via his wife, aggravated the controversy mainly 
among the secular elite, including the military and certain segments 
of civil society. On the eve of the first round of votes for election of 
the president held in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the military 
issued a statement on its official website, highlighting the threat to 
secularism and hinting at a possible intervention if deemed necessary. 
The statement demonstrated that despite the legal amendments and 
institutional reforms undertaken thus far, the military still perceived 
itself as the guarantor of secularism as well as the territorial integrity of 
Turkey. The AKP responded that this was unacceptable in a democracy 
where the military should be subordinate to the government and 
proceeded with the election of Gül as the president, leading to a 
considerable loss of power on the part of the military vis-à-vis the 
civilian authority (Aydın-Düzgit and Çarkoğlu 2009).
The reforms that followed cannot be attributed solely to the incident 
of the military memorandum alone. In addition to the expanding 
confidence and legitimacy of the AKP after the 2007 general elections, 
two other crucial developments triggered further reform in this area 
(Gürsoy 2011: 297). One concerns the split within the military on their 
role in politics, where there was rising disagreement on the strategies 
to be deployed in dealing with the government (Gürsoy 2011: 297). The 
second, and possibly more influential development was the launch 
of a comprehensive investigation into a neo-nationalist gang named 
Ergenekon in 2008, on the grounds that it was engaging in plans to 
stage a violent uprising against the government. The Ergenekon case 
was soon to be followed by the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) case that was 
initiated in December 2010 against around 200 officers in the Turkish 
military with the accusation of engaging in coup plots against the 
government. 
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The Ergenekon and Balyoz cases led to the arrest and trial of hundreds 
of active and retired military officers of all ranks, the most notable of 
which was the arrest of the former Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ, hence 
fuelling the public debate on the role of the military in politics, 
contributing to the declining levels of societal trust toward the military 
and increasing the impetus for further reform in this area (Gürsoy 2011: 
298).5  The first notable sign of reform after the long pause came in 
June 2009 when the Parliament passed legislation that allowed civilian 
courts to try military officers in peacetime, including in the event of 
attempted coups, and lifted the remaining powers of military courts 
to try civilians in peacetime. This was followed in January 2010 by the 
abolition of the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order 
(EMASYA), which granted the military the right to carry out operations 
against internal security threats without the consent of the civilian 
authority (CNNTurk 2010).
These reforms were followed by a series of constitutional amendments 
introduced by the constitutional referendum of September 2010 
which addressed, above all, a long debated legislative/institutional 
issue concerning the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
that were until then immune from judicial oversight. The constitutional 
amendments opened dismissals of military personnel by the SMC to 
judicial review. Concerning judicial matters regarding the military, the 
2010 constitutional amendments introduced further reforms such as 
lifting the constitutional restrictions on the trial of the perpetrators 
of the 1980 coup, allowing for the trial of the Chief of Staff and the 
commanders of the army, navy, the air force and the gendarmerie 
before a high tribunal for any offences committed during their official 
duties; and limiting the jurisdiction of military courts to military 
service and military duties. These legislative/institutional reforms 
on judicial matters concerning the military were combined after 
the constitutional referendum with those reforms that targeted the 
military’s autonomy in the economic sphere. Although reforms carried 
out in the 1999-2005 period had tackled the military’s economic 
power mainly by enhancing the transparency of defence expenditures 
by expanding the remit of the Court of Auditors to the military 
budget, there remained significant problems regarding the audit of 
extra budgetary resources as well as the actual implementation of 
the Court of Auditors’ new powers due to the lack of the necessary 
amendments to the Law on the Court of Auditors (Gürsoy 2011: 303). 
This was remedied through the adoption of the Law on the Court 
of Auditors in December 2010 that allowed for the external ex-post 
audits of military expenditure and for the audits of extra budgetary 
resources that belong to the defence sector, including the Defence 
Industry Support Fund that covers military procurement (European 
Commission 2011: 13).
The empowerment of civilian authority vis-à-vis the military has gone 
beyond legislative and constitutional changes and has been reflected 
in actual policy practices. For instance, the military’s autonomy in 
taking decisions on matters related to the promotion and retirement 
of military personnel in the SMC has started to erode. This was first 
demonstrated in August 2010 when the government intervened in the 
decisions concerning the appointment and promotion of senior level 
military officials.6  In July 2011, this loss of autonomy reached its peak 
publicly when the chief of staff and the commanders of the army, navy 
and the air forces requested their retirement prior to the annual SMC 
meeting in response to the government’s insistence on the retirement 
of the military officers who were imprisoned as suspects during the 
Balyoz trials. Contrary to the SMC tradition where the civilians merely 
rubberstamped the military’s decisions on their officers’ careers, the 
government had not taken up the military’s suggestion to postpone 
the decisions on the suspects’ appointments and promotions until 
the case was resolved and presided over the SMC in which it swiftly 
filled the new posts, thus demonstrating its acquired control over the 
5 Eurobarometer data shows that for the first time in 2010, the level of societal trust in 
the Turkish military reached the same level (70 percent) observed on average in EU 
member states.
6 Despite the wish of the military, civilians prevented the appointment of a four-star 
general, Hasan Igsiz, as the commander of the army because of allegations that he 
was involved in coup plots against the government. See Radikal 2010.
career decisions of top military personnel (Hürriyet 2011). The policy 
of retiring military officers detained under the ongoing cases was 
continued in the SMC meeting of August 2012.
A similar case in which civilian empowerment is evident concerns 
the drafting of the National Security Policy Document (Milli Güvenlik 
Siyaset Belgesi), a classified state document which lists the internal and 
external threats to national security. While the document was in the 
past prepared exclusively by the military, the government took an 
active part in changing the document in 2010, reportedly removing 
Russia, Iran, Iraq and Greece from the list of potential security threats 
in line with the government’s “zero problems with neighbours” foreign 
policy maxim (Hürriyet Daily News 2010).
There are also certain changes in symbolic practices which suggest 
realignment in Turkish civil-military relations (Sarıgil 2012: 10-11). For 
instance, while the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff traditionally 
sat together at the head of the table in SMC meetings, this changed 
for the first time in August 2011 when the Prime Minister chaired the 
meeting alone. In a similar vein, while civilians and military officers 
in the past sat separately on each side of the table in NSC meetings, 
there has been mixed seating on both sides of the table since August 
2011. Another symbolic change has been the decision taken in 2011 
to remove from the parliament’s premises the military unit entrusted 
with protecting the parliament. 
The legislative/constitutional amendments, the ongoing trials on 
coup allegations, actual changes in internalised traditional practices 
and even changes in symbolic practices have played a considerable 
role in moving the 1999-2005 reforms in civil-military relations forward 
by substantially reducing the prerogatives of the military (most 
notably in the judicial and economic spheres) and empowering the 
civilian authority. Having said that, there are still remaining problems 
concerning the full civilianisation of Turkish politics. 
The organisation of the defence sector remains problematic with the 
Chief of Staff still reporting to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister 
of Defence, and with the Gendarmerie - responsible for ensuring 
security and public order in areas that are outside the jurisdiction of 
the police - reporting to the Chief of Staff rather than the Minister 
of the Interior. Although civilians are now much more active in SMC 
decisions, career management decisions taken in the SMC meetings 
are exempt from judicial review, with the exception of those that relate 
to the expulsion of military personnel. Reforms enacted with a view 
to eroding the economic prerogatives of the military face difficulties 
Box 1. Post-2005 reforms in civil-military relations
» With the amendments to the Military Criminal Code in June 2006, civilians 
will not be tried in military courts in peacetime unless military personnel 
and civilians commit an offence together. The amendments also introduced 
the right of retrial in military courts in accordance with the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
» In January 2010, the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order 
(EMASYA), which granted the military the right to carry out operations 
against internal security threats without the approval of civilian authority, 
was abolished.
» With the constitutional amendments of September 2010, the expulsions of 
military staff by the SMC were made subject to judicial review.
» The constitutional amendments of September 2010 lifted the constitutional 
immunity of the perpetrators of the 1980 coup.
» The September 2010 constitutional amendments limited the jurisdiction 
of military courts to “military service and military duties”, and allowed civilian 
courts to try military officials accused of crimes against state security, the 
constitutional order and its functioning.
» The Law on the Court of Auditors adopted in December 2010 allowed 
for external ex-post audits of armed forces’ expenditure and audits of extra 
budgetary resources in the defence sector.
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in implementation due to the unwillingness in practice of civilian 
actors to use their new powers. For instance, parliamentary oversight 
of military expenditure remains very limited in practice, whereby 
ministers from both the government and the opposition parties in the 
Planning and Budgeting Commission barely deliberate on the military 
budget or the projects of the Ministry of Defence (Akyeşilmen 2010). 
The military continues to retain its autonomy in intelligence-gathering, 
where there is still a lack of transparency and accountability regarding 
the powers of the gendarmerie (European Commission 2011: 13). The 
Internal Service Law of the armed forces is untouched in the sense that 
it allows substantial military intervention in politics through Article 35 
and Article 85/1, which define the duties of the Turkish armed forces 
in protecting and preserving the Turkish Republic on the basis of the 
principles referred to in the preamble of the Constitution, including 
territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism (Turkey 1961). In a 
similar vein, while the functioning and organisation of the NSC have 
largely been changed with the first wave of EU led reforms, the Law on 
the National Security Council still retains a broad definition of security, 
which covers both domestic and foreign threats to national existence 
and unity (Turkey 1983).
It is important that these issues be addressed so that the military, 
having largely lost its Kemalist guardianship role, does not continue 
to be involved in politics as “a tool of a new set of elites” through old 
instruments (Aydınlı 2012: 106). This is particularly pertinent in the 
current political environment in which the rising violence by the 
PKK heightens societal insecurity and threatens civilianisation efforts. 
This was recently visible in the Uludere incident of December 2011, 
in which the Turkish military launched a botched air raid killing 34 
villagers along the Iraqi border. The incident still lacks a thorough 
investigation as to who initiated it and how the military mistakenly 
concluded that the villagers were in fact a group of PKK militants. 
Furthermore, the government actually expressed its support for the 
military in response to public outcry by claiming that the “region is a 
terror region” and the military did what needed to be done (Hürriyet 
Daily News 2012). Members of the opposition parties in the Uludere 
Commission, established in Parliament in January 2012 to investigate 
the incident, have repeatedly complained about the covert alliance 
between the office of the Chief of Staff, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Prosecutor’s Office in Diyarbakır in withholding key information from 
the Commission and thus hampering the parliamentary investigation 
(Başaran 2012).
Nevertheless, reform in civil-military relations is expected to continue, 
with the main opposition party, the CHP, also displaying a progressive 
attitude on the matter. Yet, it is also important that this transformation 
does not fuel the existing dividing lines within society so as to 
hamper democratic consolidation. This is particularly the case for the 
handling of the Balyoz and Ergenekon trials, where claims of sustained 
misconduct are found to feed into the existing polarisation along the 
pro-Islamist and secularist divide in Turkish society (Gürsoy 2012). In 
its March 2012 report, the European Parliament also made mention of 
these trials, expressing concern “about the allegations regarding the 
use of inconsistent evidence against the defendants in these cases” and 
called on the Commission to look into these cases in more depth and 
report its findings with the 2012 Progress Report (European Parliament 
2012: para. 18). The Balyoz verdict delivered in September 2012, which 
resulted in the conviction of 325 defendants, met with criticism in 
both the media and society regarding the heavy prison sentences 
delivered, as well as the violations of the right to fair trial.7  Allegations 
that the government is working in tandem with the network of the 
Islamic Fethullah Gülen movement in the security establishment in 
reorganising the army through these cases shed further doubt on the 
adherence to the rule of law in the thorny road towards civilianisation, 
bolstering the mistrust primarily among the secularist segments in 
society. It is thus imperative for democratic consolidation that the 
government allows for an “honourable exit” for the military, whereby 
these trials (and their appeals) are conducted more rapidly, with due 
respect for defendants’ rights, without prolonged detention periods 
7 The case awaits apppeal at the Court of Cassation.
and with the possibility of an amnesty for those who are charged 
(Aydınlı 2012: 106).
Human rights
In the 1999-2005 period, important steps were taken to strengthen 
fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the lifting of the state of 
emergency and the death penalty, introduction of a new Penal Code 
with articles broadening the freedom of expression and association, 
stronger protection of detainee rights along with a significant decrease 
in pre-trial detention periods, abolition of Art. 8 of the (previous) Anti-
Terror Law (propaganda against the indivisibility of the state) and 
the introduction of the right to learn and broadcast in languages 
other than Turkish, namely Kurdish. In addition to these legislative 
reforms, specific measures were enacted to ensure implementation, 
such as intensive human rights training for public officials and the 
establishment of Human Rights Boards, a Human Rights Presidency 
and a parliamentary Human Rights Inquiry Commission. 
Although human rights reforms were not entirely abandoned in the 
post-2005 period, they slowed down considerably, leaving problems 
with the legal framework as well as the implementation of the already 
reformed laws in the areas of the fight against torture, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and minority rights (Hale 2011). 
As can be seen in Figure 2 (in the Annex), applications (allocated to 
a decision-making body) to the ECtHR have increased progressively 
since 2005, reaching a record high 8702 applications in 2011, more 
than double the average annual number of applications filed in 2005-
2010.8 Most of these applications concerned the right to a fair trial 
and property rights, followed by freedom of expression and torture/
ill-treatment. 
The state of progress in the area of fundamental rights seems to be 
mixed, for instance with certain advances being made in the fight 
against torture while even some steps back seem to have been 
made with regard to freedom of expression. Overall, there has been 
limited legal reform with the exception of the new law on Foundations 
passed in February 2008, the (albeit insufficient) amendments to the 
infamous Article 301 (insulting Turkish identity and state institutions), 
the ratification of OPCAT (Optional Protocol to UN Convention against 
Torture) in September 2011 and three constitutional amendments 
passed with the 2010 constitutional referendum, namely the right of 
petition as a constitutional right which establishes an Ombudsman 
(Art. 74), the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court with regard 
to fundamental rights and freedoms (Art. 148) and the guarantee that 
civilians will not be tried before military courts except in times of war 
(Arts. 145).
Problems of institutional and administrative capacity continued, 
concerning for instance the functioning of new institutions such as 
the Human Rights Boards, established to ensure compliance on the 
ground, which remain dependent on the Prime Ministry and lack the 
necessary resources (European Commission 2011: 21). The new law 
establishing a Human Rights Institution finally passed in June 2012, 
having been on the government’s agenda since 2004. This came as a 
major disappointment, given its limited capabilities and its high degree 
of dependence on the executive.9  Normative constraints among the 
state bureaucracy and the political elite, where “state sensitivities” are 
internalised to the extent that they exceed the interests of society, 
seem to provide the biggest obstacle to the reform process, continuing 
to create a climate of impunity for the perpetrators of human rights 
violations (see also the judicial system) and preventing the emergence 
of a sustainable human rights regime and culture from taking root in 
the country. 
8 Figures were compiled from ECtHR annual statistics.
9 The Institution consists of 11 members of whom 7 are appointed by the Council of 
Ministers, 2 by the President, 1 by the High Education Council (YÖK) and 1 by the bar 
associations. See Ergin 2012a.
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The fight against torture and ill-treatment
It is difficult to assess the extent of progress in the field of fighting 
torture and ill-treatment due to a dearth of reliable official statistical 
data on the matter. Nonetheless, a recent Council of Europe (CoE) 
report recorded a downward trend in recent years in both the 
incidence and severity of torture and ill-treatment cases, in line with 
the government’s zero tolerance policy against torture announced in 
2003 (Council of Europe 2011b: 14). Legislation in this area was already 
considerably strengthened with the 1999-2005 reforms, coupled with 
the implementation of various projects to raise awareness in society 
and intensive training provided to public officials about the changes 
made to the legislation and regulations governing law enforcement 
agencies (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 23-27). Additional steps have been 
taken since 2005, the most notable of which are the ratification of 
OPCAT, providing for the establishment of one or several independent 
monitoring bodies entrusted with inspecting places of detention; 
continued training and awareness-raising for judges, prosecutors and 
forensic experts on the Istanbul Protocol10  and the setting up of video 
and audio recording systems at police quarters with the aid of EU-
funded projects.11  Unlike the 1990s, torture is no longer being used as 
a widespread measure to obtain confessions (Doğru 2012: 28).
Box 2. Post-2005 reforms undertaken to strengthen the fight against 
torture
» OPCAT, which requests Turkey to establish one or more independent 
monitoring bodies called National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs), was 
ratified in September 2011.
» Article 145 of the Constitution was amended with the 2010 Constitutional 
Referendum to prevent the trial of civilians by military courts except in 
times of war.
» Training for judges, prosecutors and forensic experts in line with a better 
implementation of the Istanbul Protocol has continued.
» Audio- and video-recording systems continue to be set up in police and 
gendarmerie statement taking rooms.
Despite considerable progress, the fight against torture and ill 
treatment is not over. First of all, some of the current legal measures 
introduced by the 2006 amendments to the Anti-Terror Law have 
the propensity to create an environment more conducive to torture 
and ill-treatment, particularly in the current political environment in 
which rising violence and the “fight against terror” threatens individual 
liberties. The article which raises the risk the most is Section 10 (e) of 
the Anti-Terror Law, which stipulates that upon the order of a public 
prosecutor, a detainee may be denied access to a lawyer during the 
initial 24 hours of custody if suspected of committing a terrorism-
related offence, even though it is mostly in the immediate aftermath 
of being taken into custody that torture and ill-treatment occurs. This 
exception needs to be revoked. In fact, the original justification for 
introducing the requirement of immediate access to a lawyer for all 
detained persons was precisely to create an effective measure to fight 
torture and ill-treatment in Turkey (Council of Europe 2011b: 18).
There are also other legislative obstacles raised in our earlier paper that 
remain untouched by the 1999-2005 reforms. For instance, forensic 
medical doctors, with the exception of those that operate under 
the Forensic Medicine Council, and thus the Ministry of Justice, are 
10 The Istanbul Protocol is a set of “international guidelines for the assessment of 
persons who allege torture and ill-treatment, for investigating cases of alleged torture 
and for reporting findings to the judiciary or any other investigative body” (UNHCHR 
2004: 1).
11 The most comprehensive EU-funded training project in this field was entitled 
“Training Programme on the Istanbul Protocol: Enhancing the Knowledge Level of 
Non-Forensic Expert Physicians, Judges and Prosecutors” whereas the project on 
“Purchase of Machinery and Equipment for Detention and Statement Taking Rooms” 
set up video and audio recording systems across the country (Council of Europe 
2011c: 16-17).
still not recognised by the courts, leading to a lack of independent 
forensic services and allegations of partiality in the delivery of medical 
reports. Similarly, in the absence of an independent judicial police, 
investigations into torture and ill-treatment continue to be commonly 
conducted by law enforcement officers, and in many cases by the 
superiors of the perpetrators, while the perpetrators commonly 
remain in office, thus undermining the independence, impartiality and 
effectiveness of the process (UN 2011: 63). Another legal impediment 
to a more effective fight against torture and ill-treatment concerns the 
statute of limitations. Although the statute of limitations was increased 
to 15 years for torture and 40 years for death caused by torture with 
the 2005 Penal Code, torture cases are still being dropped because of 
the huge backlog of cases in the Turkish judiciary (see the section on 
the judicial system). Thus the state of limitations needs to be unlimited 
altogether for all cases that concern torture and ill-treatment.12  It has 
been reported that the draft (fourth) judicial reform package that is 
currently under preparation proposes to lift the statute of limitations 
for all torture cases (Milliyet 2012b).
Nonetheless, more than these new and remaining legislative 
provisions, it is the “culture of impunity” that allows the police and the 
gendarmerie to escape accountability for torture which continues 
to represent the main hindrance to further progress in this area. For 
instance, a report by the Human Rights Investigation Commission 
Report found that, between 2003 and 2008, only 2 percent of the 2140 
personnel who were investigated on accusations of torture and ill-
treatment were given disciplinary sentences (US Dept. of State 2009). 
In some cases, it is the lack of a normative shift among public officials 
and the political elite towards the unacceptability of torture, even in 
cases where the interests of the “state” are perceived to be at stake, 
which provides the main hindrance to the eradication of torture. The 
presence of law enforcement officers during medical examinations 
even though the legal reforms forbid this or the hasty and superficial 
examinations and reports of medical doctors who are not willing to 
deliver detailed evaluations attest to this (Council of Europe 2011b: 
19). 
In most cases, however, this problem of normative internalisation 
combines with legal loopholes to provide full effect to impunity 
for perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment despite the undertaken 
reforms. For instance in some cases, the public prosecutors choose 
to bring charges of torture and ill-treatment under those articles of 
the Turkish Penal Code (such as Article 256 - “excessive use of force” 
or Article 86 - “intentional injury” - rather than Article 94 - “torture” - or 
Article 95 - “aggravated torture due to circumstances”) where relatively 
lighter sentences can be delivered and/or where there is an obligation 
to obtain prior administrative authorisation for an investigation. This 
is, despite the fact that the sentences for torture cases have been 
increased and the requirement for prior administrative authorisation 
for torture and ill-treatment cases has been lifted by the earlier 
legislative reforms (Council of Europe 2012b: para. 46). This was most 
recently demonstrated in the Engin Çeber case which attracted large 
media attention, where a political activist arrested for distributing a 
legal journal in September 2008 died of torture in October 2008. In the 
initial indictment, the public prosecutor brought charges under Article 
96 (“maltreatment conducted by ordinary citizens”) and Article 257 
(“misconduct in public office”) rather than Articles 94 and 95 (Atılgan 
and Işık 2012: 15-17).
The dovetailing of normative constraints with the legal loopholes 
is also demonstrated in the practice of the police officers who, 
accused of torture and ill-treatment, bring counter charges against 
the plaintiffs on the basis of (most commonly) Article 265 of the 
Penal Code, which concerns resistance to public officials preventing 
them from carrying out their duties. It has been argued that the new 
Police Law of June 2007 has increased the propensity to resort to this 
practice by expanding the powers of the police (Radikal 2007). It has 
also been reported that such counter charges are often dealt with 
12 In fact, approximately 20 percent of all the cases in the Turkish justice system are 
dropped every year due to the statute of limitations (Atılgan and Işık 2012: 30-31).
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more rapidly by the criminal justice system (see also the section on 
the judiciary) (Atılgan and Işık 2012: 15-17; Council of Europe 2012b: 
para. 56). Individuals thus refrain from filing complaints for torture 
and ill-treatment for fear of counter charges against them (Amnesty 
International 2010: 8). Intimidating the plaintiffs and undermining 
their credibility is increasingly becoming a common strategy in getting 
around the reforms and achieving impunity. For instance, in the Engin 
Çeber case, Çeber’s claims of having been tortured before his death 
were not investigated by the prosecutor, whereas an investigation was 
launched against him on the basis of Article 265. 
These findings demonstrate that, despite the reforms which have led 
to certain progress in the fight against torture and ill-treatment, reform 
resistant forces among the police and the judiciary are finding novel 
ways to adapt to the new legal and institutional environment. This is 
also bolstered by the divided nature of the commitment of the political 
elite to fighting torture and ill-treatment. On the one hand, there are 
some signs of normative internalisation among the governing elite 
as seen in the Çeber case, where the Minister of Justice gave a public 
apology for Çeber’s death under torture. On the other hand, however, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s public support for the recent appointment 
of a police officer whose actions caused Turkey to be fined by the 
ECtHR in two torture cases, as the deputy chief of the Istanbul Police 
Department’s anti-terrorism bureau, demonstrates the limits of this 
internalisation and strengthens the drive for impunity, especially 
under the banner of the “fight against terrorism” (Radikal 2012).
It is apparent that one way to pursue reform in this area is to address 
the legal shortcomings highlighted above. But this, on its own, 
would not be sufficient given the quick adaptation shown by law 
enforcement officers and the members of the judiciary in pre-empting 
the proper implementation of legal reforms. Hence there is a need to 
intensify institutional reform, such as setting up an independent police 
complaints mechanism or rapidly expanding the number of video and 
audio recording systems at police quarters which still remains very 
low.13  Perhaps more importantly, however, is the need for continued 
intensive training for the members of the police force and the judiciary 
in both their formal education and also during their active careers on 
the implementation of the Istanbul protocol and on the primacy of 
individual rights and liberties over the state. Civil society institutions 
can also be involved in similar training programmes for informing the 
public of their rights relating to custody.
Freedom of expression
Freedom of expression is an area in which the progress that was 
made with the 1999-2005 reforms has been substantially reversed, 
to the extent that the curtailment of this freedom has now become 
one of the major sources of domestic and international criticism of 
the current state of Turkish democracy. The President of the Court of 
Cassation recently declared that problems with freedom of expression 
are growing in Turkey, while the issue was brought up for the first 
time in a European Council summit declaration on enlargement 
in December 2011 (Ergin 2012c). ECtHR judge, Işıl Karakaş, declared 
in November 2011 that Turkey has the highest number of ECtHR 
decisions for violations of freedom of expression among all of the 
Council of Europe members. Turkey, with two hundred violations 
of the freedom of expression, was followed by France with only ten 
violations (BİA 2011b).
The EU-led reform in the mid-2000s not only led to legislative changes, 
but was also translated into practice, resulting in a substantial decline 
in the number of individuals arrested for expressing their opinions 
(Alpay 2010). According to Human Rights Watch, as of November 2005, 
there were no individuals serving prison sentences for the non-violent 
expression of their opinions (Human Rights Watch 2006). However by 
June 2012, 95 journalists alone were reported to be imprisoned, 62 of 
which were detained in relation to their reporting on the Kurdish issue. 
13 As of 2011, digital audio and video systems were set up in 63 out of more than 
2000 detention centres and testimony rooms (US Dept. of State 2012: 6).
This increase has been progressive, from 15 imprisoned journalists 
in June 2009 to 57, 68 and 95 respectively in the three years that 
followed.14  
The current stalemate in this area stems from the combination of a 
multitude of legal provisions and the mindset of the judiciary. The 
Constitution itself (in particular Articles 26 and 28) provides the 
main hindrance, given the limits that it imposes on the freedom of 
expression on the basis of national security, public order and national 
unity. In view of this, we reiterate our suggestion first set down in our 
2004 paper to constitutionally guarantee the right to the freedom 
of press and of expression without censorship by amending Articles 
26 and 28 of the Constitution as a key point of reform in the current 
constitutional deliberations. Besides the Constitution, the main 
legislative provisions that are most commonly used to restrict free 
speech concern the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. 
The main problem with the Penal Code is that, although it was passed as 
a part of the EU reform process in 2005, it retained key provisions of the 
old Penal Code that served to restrict the freedom of expression in the 
past. These articles are most prominently Article 215 (praising a crime 
or criminal), Article 216 (inciting the population to enmity or hatred 
and denigration), Article 301 (insulting the Turkish nation, the Turkish 
Republic, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the government or the 
judicial organs of the state) and Article 318 (discouraging persons from 
doing their military service). Articles 218 and 318 further increase the 
punishment in those cases where these acts are committed through 
the press or other types of publications. Although the infamous Article 
301 which was used to convict writer and journalist Hrant Dink, laying 
the groundwork for his assassination in 2007, was amended in 2008 
(where the maximum penalty was lowered from three to two years 
of imprisonment, the phrase “insulting Turkishness” was replaced by 
“insulting the Turkish nation” and investigations under this Article 
was tied to the permission of the Minister of Justice for each case), 
the changes were largely cosmetic, only temporarily decreasing the 
number of proceedings brought under the Article and leaving open 
the possibility for its abuse in the future. 
While the maintenance of these articles and their widespread use in 
limiting the freedom of expression testify to the effects of incomplete 
legal reform, the case of the Anti-Terror Law demonstrates a reversal 
in the sense that the amendments made to this law in 2006 actually 
introduced new limits to fundamental rights and freedoms, including 
the freedom of speech (Aytar 2006). For instance, with the 2006 
amendments, the punishment for crimes under Article 6 (printing 
or publishing declarations or leaflets emanating from terrorist 
organisations) was changed from a fine to from one to three years 
imprisonment. The same article also allows for the suspension (by 
judicial order) of publications that contain propaganda of a terrorist 
organisation, incitement to commit a crime or praise for a crime 
committed for up to a month, and makes the publications’ editors and 
owners liable for these crimes. In many cases, the Anti-Terror Law is 
used in combination with the Penal Code (Article 220 - propaganda 
in favour of a criminal organisation) to persecute even non-violent 
statements when they are perceived to concur with the aims of a 
terrorist organisation (Council of Europe 2011a: para. 27).
These legal provisions became prominent instruments in curbing 
the freedom of expression, particularly against the background of 
KCK (Koma Ciwaken Kurdistan - Kurdistan Communities Union)15 
operations initiated in April 2009. Not only has no substantial progress 
been achieved towards the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in the 
post-2005 period, tensions have grown further, first with the closure 
of the Kurdish nationalist DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic 
Society Party) in December 2009 (renamed BDP - Barış ve Demokrasi 
14 Figures were retrieved from the annual BİA Media Monitoring Reports.
15 The KCK is an umbrella organisation of Kurdish movements in Turkey (including 
the PKK), Iran, Iraq and Syria and aims to form parallel alternative structures to the 
official organs of justice, management and politics in these countries. While its leader 
is reportedly Abdullah Öcalan, its Executive Council is headed by a PKK commander, 
Murat Karayılan.
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Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party, following its 2009 closure), 
followed by the intensification of KCK operations in September 2010. 
The operations and the ensuing trials have seen the prosecution of 
prominent political leaders and activists of the Kurdish movement 
on the grounds that they constitute the political organisation of the 
PKK in urban centres, or of their opinions expressed in speeches, the 
press and other publications. This led to a sixfold rise in prosecutions 
from 2009 to 2010, when 150 people were prosecuted under the Anti-
Terror Law for expressing opinions or reporting on subjects related to 
the Kurdish minority and the PKK (Freedom House 2012). As of June 
2012, 62 out of 95 journalists imprisoned were being detained in 
relation to KCK and related trials. Between April and June 2012 alone, 
61 indictments were prepared against members of the BDP regarding 
their statements on the Kurdish question (BİA 2012).
In addition to the KCK trials, the Ergenekon case has also played 
a prominent role in boosting the curtailment of the freedom 
of expression. In fact, it was the detainment of two well-known 
opposition journalists on the basis of Article 220 of the Penal Code 
within the scope of the Ergenekon investigation that brought the 
freedom of expression cases into the international spotlight in March 
2011. Their detainment raised vocal criticism from the EU, the Council 
of Europe and international human rights organisations against the 
deteriorating levels of freedom of the press in the country, only to 
be rebuffed by the Prime Minister on the grounds that journalists 
were being detained due to their links with terrorist organisations 
and attempts to overthrow the government (Ntvmsnbc 201). Article 
285 (breaching the confidentiality of criminal organisations) and 
Article 288 (attempting to influence judicial bodies unlawfully) also 
played a key role in the mounting pressure on journalists covering 
the Ergenekon case (Council of Europe 2011a: para. 20). As of January 
2012, there were around 5000 ongoing investigations opened against 
journalists on the basis of these articles (Ergin 2012b).
These cases imply that the existing legislative provisions and the 
new legal measures are being used to violate the right to free speech 
primarily when the government’s authority and/or its Kurdish policy are 
being challenged. In the face of growing domestic and international 
criticism and the cases piling up at the ECtHR, the government 
embarked on a legislative reform strategy (also known as the third 
judicial reform package) adopted in July 2012 to revise some of the 
legislative provisions that stand in the way of freedom of expression. 
Nonetheless, while including some progressive measures such as 
suspending offences committed via the media to 31 December 2011 
for three years (and scrapping the accusation for good if the same 
offence is not recommitted within those three years), the third reform 
package leaves the main legislative provisions used in curbing free 
speech largely intact (Keskin 2012). The draft (fourth) reform package 
that is reported to contain important provisions in expanding the 
freedom of expression has not yet been submitted to Parliament.
Regarding legislative provisions, constraints on the freedom of 
expression are also imposed through laws that specifically pertain to 
the media sector. Although the Press Act, which was amended in 2004, 
was welcomed as a positive step towards expanding media freedoms, 
it continues to contain numerous restrictions on these freedoms 
by making references to “public security”, “territorial integrity” and 
“state secrets”. Although prepared with a view to aligning it with the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive of the EU, the more recent Act 
on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their 
Broadcasts, adopted in 2011, also contains numerous restrictions on 
the freedom of the media open to subjective interpretation, such as 
“protection of the family” and “public morality”, which are not contained 
in the EU Directive. The Internet Law adopted in 2007 has been largely 
criticised for the wide and vague legal foundations that it introduces in 
denying access to websites (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 37-38).
As also highlighted in our 2004 paper, despite the pressing need for 
legal reform that would involve a comprehensive review of all existing 
laws that restrict the freedom of expression, amending these laws has 
its limits since the most important challenge for Turkey is to change 
the mindset of those who exercise these legal provisions. Most of 
Turkey’s violations of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) are found to emanate from a lack of proportionality in 
the interpretation and implementation of these legal provisions by 
judges and public prosecutors. For instance, in contrast to ECtHR case 
law, the Turkish judiciary is commonly found to apply a very wide 
interpretation of “incitement to violence” and to disregard the “defence 
of truth” (assessing “whether the content of journalistic reporting is 
true”) and “defence of public interest” (assessing “whether the public 
has a legitimate interest in and a right to obtain the information in 
question”) in delivering its judgements on cases relating to the freedom 
of expression (Council of Europe 2011a: para. 37). Hence intensive and 
systematic training of judges and public prosecutors on the case law 
of the ECtHR remains a key requirement for substantial reform in this 
area. It is also essential that this be supplemented by changes in the 
curricula of law faculties and the Turkish Academy of Justice, where 
the focus should be placed on specific and relevant cases from the 
ECtHR as well as EU member states, together with the arguments and 
discussions surrounding these cases.
The problem with mindsets, however, also extends to the bureaucracy 
that runs the media regulatory authorities, such as the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and the Telecommunications 
Communication Presidency (TIB), which is responsible for regulating 
the internet environment. Both institutions lack autonomy, are 
largely dependent on political authority and apply wide discretion in 
interpreting the legislative provisions for which they are competent.16 
In 2011, RTÜK issued eighty-nine fines, three hundred and eighty three 
warnings, twenty-seven suspensions and one notice to twenty-seven 
radio and four hundred and eighty television channels (BİA 2011a). 
As of September 2012, 20,690 websites are blocked with 84.7% of 
the blocking decisions coming from the TIB.17  It has been argued 
that in cases where nationalist and conservative values clash with 
fundamental rights and freedoms, these regulators systematically 
uphold the primacy of the family, nation and state above the individual 
(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 17). Thus it is crucial that, in addition to 
undertaking a reformist review of the acts that grant these institutions 
their powers, their competences also need to be restricted and their 
institutional composition decoupled from political processes.
The political economy of the media sector presents the final major 
obstacle to the freedom of expression in Turkey. While not a new 
phenomenon, almost all of the major media groups in the country 
have investments in key sectors of the economy (i.e. energy, 
telecommunications, finance) where they are not prevented by law 
from entering into public tenders. This creates a media landscape 
in which the public interest can be compromised by economic 
and political interests (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 18). Against this 
background, certain policies of the strong single-party administration 
and its politicians can impact on editorial policies and reinforce self-
censorship. For instance, the tax fine issued in 2009 against the Doğan 
Media Group was perceived by many as a reaction by the government 
to the group’s criticism of it. In a similar vein, on multiple occasions 
the Prime Minister has warned the media conglomerates that they are 
responsible for the writings of their columnists and that they should 
exercise control over them where necessary (Ntvmsnbc 2010).
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association
The 1999-2005 reforms included considerable measures taken to 
expand the freedom of assembly and association, especially by easing 
the restrictions on organising demonstrations and by abolishing some 
16 The nine members of RTÜK are selected by the Parliament from the candidates 
proposed by the political parties in accordance with their seat shares in the 
Parliament. The seven members of TİB are appointed by the Council of Ministers 
whereas there is one representative each from the National Intelligence Organisation, 
Turkish National Police and the Gendarmerie in the institution.
17 The rest of these decisions emanate from the courts, public prosecutors and the 
High Election Board. For figures on the blocked websites, see http://www.engelliweb.
com.
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pre-existing limitations on setting up associations, their membership 
requirements and the general regulations regarding their activities. 
On the freedom of peaceful assembly, these reforms brought the legal 
framework broadly in line with EU standards which were also reflected 
in implementation.18  Nonetheless, loopholes in the existing and new 
legislation, coupled with the setbacks in implementation and the 
new political developments have led to the resurgence of problems 
in this area. Excessive use of force by the police has been observed 
particularly in demonstrations concerning the Kurdish issue, as well 
as those on students’ rights, trade union rights and the environment. 
As with torture and ill-treatment, impunity of the security forces has 
remained a major concern, with investigations depending on the 
permission of governors that in some cases are not forthcoming or 
involving scarce disciplinary sanctions.19  
On the legal front, especially since 2008, Articles 220 (propaganda 
for a terrorist organisation, committing a crime on behalf of an 
organisation without being a member) and 314 (membership in 
an armed organisation) of the Penal Code were combined with the 
amended Article 2 of the Anti-Terror Law (committing a crime on 
behalf of a terrorist organisation) to deliver an increasing number of 
prosecutions of protestors in the face of the rising stalemate in the 
Kurdish issue (Human Rights Watch 2010: 1). The mindset of the 
judiciary has proved instrumental once again in delivering restrictive 
interpretations of these vague articles, as evidenced in a precedent-
setting 2008 case in which the Court of Cassation decided that joining 
protests publicly supported by the PKK is a crime. Human rights 
organisations have underlined that even when a specific appeal by the 
PKK is not discernable, protesters are frequently charged with acting 
under PKK orders (Human Rights Watch 2010: 3). Hence, as with the 
closely related freedom of expression, resolving the current setbacks 
in the freedom of peaceful assembly requires both legal reform 
concerning the vague legal provisions open to arbitrary jurisdiction 
and the ongoing training of members of the judiciary. Constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing the right to hold demonstrations may also be 
helpful in legally enshrining this right.
Turkey’s legal regime on the freedom of association is broadly aligned 
with EU standards, in particular following the entry into force of the 
2004 Law on Associations. However, important restrictions continue 
to remain, mainly on foreign financial support for associations and 
the establishment of foreign associations and foundations. Although 
the 2004 Law on Associations replaced the “permission” required from 
the Ministry of the Interior to receive funds from organisations or 
individuals in foreign countries by “notifications” to local government 
officials, the implementation of this reform has kept the “permission” 
system intact, particularly since notification is required prior to the 
receipt of funds (SGTM 2012: 14). The cumbersome bureaucratic 
regulations for establishing foreign associations and foundations are 
still in place, and permission is still needed from the Minister of the 
Interior following approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their 
actions are still closely scrutinised, and they are required to report 
regularly to the governor’s office and the Ministry of the Interior on 
their activities and publications. Civil society organisations have 
suggested that all associations should be subject to the same rules 
and that their international activities should be guaranteed through 
the new constitution (SGTM 2012: 14).
One of the remaining fundamental constraints on the freedom of 
association concerns the current political parties’ regime in Turkey. 
Articles 68 and 69 of the current constitution contain a long list of 
broad provisions such as “the indivisible integrity of the territory and 
the nation” and the “principles of the democratic and secular republic” 
that can be invoked for the closure of political parties.20  The Law on 
18 See European Commission, Turkey Progress Reports 2007 and 2008.
19 European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, Brussels, 5 November 2008, p. 17.
20 The remaining principles which the party statutes and programmes should not 
conflict with are: independence of the state; human rights; principles of equality and 
the rule of law; sovereignty of the nation; not aiming to protect or establish class or 
group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind; not inciting citizens to crime.
Political Parties accentuates the possibility of closure by extending 
these criteria beyond what is specified in the Constitution. In particular, 
Article 80 of the Law on the “protection of the principle of unity of the 
state” and Article 81 on “preventing the creation of minorities” have 
both been invoked in the past for banning Kurdish parties (Council of 
Europe Venice Commission 2009). The Constitutional Court has taken 
several closure decisions in the past based on a strict interpretation of 
these principles.
The decision to close down a political party has been made more 
difficult with the 2001 reforms, with the decision now requiring a 
three-fifths majority in the Constitutional Court rather than a simple 
majority. In addition, alternative sanctions such as depriving the 
political party of state financial assistance were introduced (and were 
instrumental in the Constitutional Court’s decision to not to close 
down the AKP). Nonetheless, the principles that govern political 
party closure still lag behind European standards and should thus 
be revised in view of the new constitution. This remains a pertinent 
issue as demonstrated in the closure case opened against the AKP 
in March 2008, the closure of the DTP in December 2009 and the 
possibility of closure that constantly lurks over the BDP. One way to 
reform could be to constitutionally restrict closure to those political 
parties that advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political 
means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, in line with 
the Venice Commission guidelines of 1999. Racism, incitement to 
war and advocating hate crimes can also be considered as particular 
expressions of violence in this respect (Özbudun and Tarhanlı 2011: 
57).
Another possibility for reform relates to the specific procedures that are 
adopted in pursuing closure cases. A mechanism could be envisaged 
for giving political parties early warning prior to the decision to open a 
closure case. Given the substantial political repercussions of a closure 
case, the sole competence granted to the Chief Public Prosecutor in 
opening closure cases could be shared by the Parliament, either by 
means of a prior parliamentary mandate for the Prosecutor to file the 
case or through the approval by Parliament or a special designated 
commission within Parliament of the Prosecutor’s decision to open a 
case (Özbudun and Tarhanlı 2011: 57).
Protection of minorities
The phase of political reform in 1999-2005 addressed certain key 
issues relating to the rights of religious minorities in Turkey (mainly 
non-Muslim minorities), as well as of the Kurdish minority. While 
certain advances were made in extending the rights of non-Muslim 
minorities in the following period, progress has remained more limited 
with respect to the state of other religious minorities (mainly the 
Alevis) and the Kurdish minority. 
Non-Muslim minorities
The Treaty of Lausanne grants non-Muslim minorities (represented 
by approximately 23,000 Jews, 1,700 Greeks and 65,000 Armenians) 
substantial negative rights as well as some positive ones, such as 
the right to equal protection and non-discrimination, the right 
to establish private schools and provide education in their own 
language, the conditional entitlement to receive government funding 
for education in their own languages at the primary level in public 
schools, the right to settle family law or private issues in accordance 
with their own customs and the right to exercise their religion freely. 
The reform process initiated with the prospect of EU accession 
aimed mainly at resolving the shortcomings in the implementation 
of these rights, especially regarding property rights and the status of 
religious/educational institutions. One of the main problems suffered 
by religious minorities in Turkey is the lack of legal personality and 
the impossibility of acquiring or selling property. Under Turkish law, 
religious institutions do not have legal personality and they can only 
be incorporated as “foundations”, falling under the jurisdiction of 
the Foundations Law. Hence their property rights were significantly 
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limited, as only properties declared under Law No. 2762 (of 1936) were 
legally recognised (160 minority foundations) and all properties not 
listed in 1936 could be confiscated by the Turkish state. 
The reform packages (specifically the third, fourth and the sixth) 
passed between 1999 and 2005 addressed this problem by amending 
the Foundations Law and allowing non-Muslim minorities to register 
the property they actually use as long as they can prove ownership. 
Nonetheless, these measures fell short of granting full property rights 
to non-Muslim minorities since the amended law failed to bring a just 
solution regarding the return of confiscated properties and did not 
eliminate the possibility of future confiscations (Aydın and Keyman 
2012: 32). The new Law on Foundations, adopted in February 2008, 
largely addressed these matters. Under the new Law, the foundations 
can now change their scope or purpose from the one specified upon 
their original incorporation; apply for the return of their confiscated 
property that is still under Turkish state control, and own and manage 
property without prior permission (Box 3). While the implementation 
of the new Law proceeded smoothly with 200 properties returned to 
non-Muslim minority foundations between February 2008 and August 
2011, it has also been criticised for not allowing the return of properties 
seized and sold to third parties or those that were merged before the 
adoption of the new Law (European Commission 2009b: 27). This 
created the background to the amendments introduced to the Law in 
August 2011, which widened the scope of the new Law by providing 
for the return of the properties that were registered in 1936 but not 
specifically described in the original documentation, and permitted 
the foundations to receive financial compensation in cases where 
their property was sold to a third party and could not be returned. 
Nonetheless, the return of the property of merged foundations still 
remains outside the confines of the law and the Turkish government 
retains the right to seize land from religious communities (US 
Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012: 203).
Box 3. Post-2005 reforms undertaken in the field of religious 
minorities
» Under the 2008 Law on Foundations, non-Muslim community foundations 
can establish and/or participate in companies and other commercial 
entities to generate income and achieve their objectives. Donations of 
immovable property to foundations can no longer be seized or mortgaged. 
Properties no longer used can be transferred to another foundation of the 
same community, leased or have their use changed.
» The communities indicated in the Lausanne Treaty can each have one 
elected representative in the General Directorate for Foundations.
» The ninth reform package passed in April 2006 revoked the requirement 
of having a representative of “Turkish origin” of the Ministry of Education as 
the deputy head of minority schools.
» A legislative amendment adopted in February 2012 enabled the 
newspapers run by non-Muslim communities to publish official notices.
» The Ministry of National Education approved a new regulation allowing 
the Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities who are not Turkish citizens to 
be educated in minority schools (without receiving an official document 
of graduation).
Progress has been more limited on religious/educational problems 
encountered by non-Muslim minorities (Box 3). A regular dialogue 
was sustained between the government and the representatives of 
the non-Muslim communities which culminated for the first time in 
their invitation to the Parliamentary Conciliation Committee to express 
their views on the new Constitution. Regarding legal reform, the ninth 
reform package passed in April 2006 revoked the much-criticised 
requirement of having a representative of “Turkish origin” of the 
Ministry of Education as the deputy head of minority schools (Turkish 
Ministry for EU Affairs 2007: 279). There were also certain symbolic 
gestures towards non-Muslim minorities such as the realisation of 
the first religious service since 1915 at the Armenian Holy Church on 
Akdamar Island in Lake Van in 2010, which has been repeated in the 
following years. 
Despite these steps, the major problems identified in our 2004 paper 
regarding the religious/educational matters of the non-Muslim 
communities remain largely intact. Direct state interference in the 
religious and educational institutions of non-Muslim communities 
through the Directorate General of Foundations (a government 
agency that must approve their operations) continues to violate the 
Treaty of Lausanne as it restricts the right of non-Muslim minorities 
to manage and control their institutions. There is still a ban on the 
training of Christian clergy which creates chronic shortages. Although 
the government has tried to address this issue by letting foreign clergy 
work through work permits obtained on the basis of the Bylaw to 
the Law on Work Permits or by granting citizenship to some foreign 
members of (particularly the Greek Orthodox) clergy, these measures 
have only served as “ad-hoc accommodations” that “fail to ensure 
institutional integrity and independence in intra-religious decisions” 
(US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012: 205). The 
repeated suggestions of the EU to re-open Armenian and Greek 
Orthodox seminaries (both were closed in 1969) and grant these 
minorities the right to exercise and teach their religion have not yet 
been followed.
Despite such remaining issues, reforms in this field have largely been 
effective in increasing electoral support for the AKP among non-
Muslim communities in the 2007 elections. Yet, a major fault-line arose 
between these communities and the AKP with the assassination of 
the writer and journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 (Ter-Matevosyan 2010). 
The lack of an effective investigation in its aftermath resulted in the 
impunity for key figures involved in the assassination plot. The climate 
of intolerance and discrimination that paved the way for this crime 
and underlay this impunity has been observed in other major cases 
of violence against non-Muslims and raised much public controversy, 
such as the 2007 killing of three Protestants in Malatya in a publishing 
house of the local protestant community. The case continues to this 
day, but is marred by its association with the much disputed Ergenekon 
trials.21  These instances of violence and their ineffective handling are 
preventing the building of the much needed trust of the non-Muslim 
communities towards the state and undermining further reform 
(Ulusoy 2011: 419).
The issue of religious freedoms also pertains to the Alevis which 
constitute the largest religious minority in Turkey, estimated at 15 to 
25 percent of the total population. There are differing views within the 
Alevi community regarding the relationship of their faith to Islam and 
the policy reforms which they expect from the government. While 
some Alevis identify themselves as Shi’a Muslims, others reject Islam 
and perceive themselves as a separate culture. Despite their internal 
differences, there are certain common issues which they would like 
the government to address, in particular the abolition of compulsory 
religious education classes where the main focus is on Sunni Islam, 22 
official recognition of their houses of worship (Cemevis), a halt to the 
building of Sunni mosques in Alevi villages and the revision of the status 
of the Directorate General for Religious Affairs which serves the Sunni 
majority, either by abolishing it altogether or making it representative 
of the Alevi community as well. Although the government initiated an 
“Alevi opening” in 2009, when seven workshops were held to bridge 
the gap between the state and the Alevi community and certain 
symbolic steps were taken, such as the participation of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan in an Alevi fast-breaking ceremony in January 2009, these 
were not followed by any concrete policies to meet the Alevis’ key 
demands. In fact, the discriminatory discourse prevalent at the societal 
level was exploited and thus reinforced by the Prime Minister in his 
2011 election rallies, in which he made repeated references to the 
Alevi background of the CHP leader, Kılıçdaroğlu, to discredit him in 
the eyes of pious Sunni voters. For example, between April 29 and May 
21 The case was included in the scope of the Ergenekon inquiry in March 2011 on 
the grounds of suspicion that the Ergenekon organisation was behind the crimes in 
Malatya.
22 The ECtHR has decided in October 2007 that these classes provide exclusive 
instruction in the Muslim faith and requested Turkey to bring its education system 
and domestic legislation into alignment with Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.
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13 2011, the Prime Minister brought this issue up in seven separate 
election speeches (Ergin 2011).
Ensuring the correct and full implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne 
for the non-Muslim minorities and respecting fully the rights of other 
religious minorities, such as the Alevis, should be among the key 
issues in the deliberations towards a new democratic constitution. 
The most substantial provisions in the new constitution could thus 
include the abolition of having to state religious affiliation on national 
identity cards (which already contravenes Article 24 of the present 
Constitution); introducing the positive obligation of the state to take 
the necessary measures to facilitate the practice of religious freedoms 
by the non-Muslim groups indicated in the Treaty of Lausanne as well 
as other religious groups (including the right to train their clergy); 
abolition of compulsory religious education classes; the abolition or 
changing of the composition of the Directorate General for Religious 
Affairs so as to represent other religious groups such as the Alevis 
that are outside the scope of Sunni Islam; and the granting of legal 
personality to the foundations of non-Muslim communities in line 
with the Venice Commission decisions23  to fully resolve issues related 
to property rights and access to justice (Özbudun and Tarhanlı 2011: 
50-52). Nonetheless, as also highlighted in our 2004 paper, a crucial 
aspect of reform on this front entails the gradual transformation of 
the concept of citizenship and the recognition of cultural and ethnic 
pluralism in the country, which we come back to in the next section 
on the Kurdish minority. 
The Kurdish question
Resolution of the Kurdish issue remains the key element for Turkey’s 
democratic consolidation. It is not possible to make Turkish modernity 
more multicultural, Turkish democracy more consolidated, Turkish 
economy more sustainable, Turkish society more tolerant and 
peaceful, and Turkish foreign policy more proactive, multidimensional, 
and effective, without resolving the Kurdish question. As detailed in 
our first paper, the AKP government had taken steps forward on the 
Kurdish issue through the EU-led reforms it carried out in the 1999-
2005 period. Some of these reforms, such as the right to broadcast 
in Kurdish, the right to learn the Kurdish language and the right to 
name children in Kurdish, despite their limited nature, were directly 
intended to improve the lives of Kurds in the country. Other human 
rights related reforms of this period, including the lifting of the state 
of emergency, can also be considered as efforts to improve the Kurds’ 
situation. In the words of a close observer, the EU had managed to 
“desecuritise the Kurdish problem” in Turkey by empowering the 
reformist forces in society, thus paving the way for progress on this 
front (Kirişçi 2011a: 338).
The virtuous cycle of reform was soon to be replaced, however, 
by a vicious cycle of violence and the rise of Turkish and Kurdish 
nationalism, which stalled any substantial progress on this front. 
Against the background of weakening EU conditionality, the renewal 
of PKK attacks on civilian and military targets in 2005 and the ensuing 
operations contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism that was 
already underway as a response to the EU-led reform process in the 
country. No further reforms were undertaken until January 2009, when 
the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) established a new 
channel to broadcast exclusively in Kurdish. This was joined by a few 
minor reforms to make broadcasting in Kurdish possible, such as the 
approval of public use of the letters “q” and “w”  which are not present 
in the Turkish alphabet (but are widely used in Kurdish) and the public 
use of which had led to court cases in the past (Kirişçi 2011a: 344). The 
Regulation on the RTUK was amended in November 2010 to remove 
all restrictions on broadcasting in Kurdish (and other languages) by 
private and public channels at the local level, while the new Law 
on the Establishment and Broadcasting Principles of Radio and TV 
stations of March 2011 allowed for broadcasts in languages other than 
Turkish by all nationwide radio and television stations. A number of 
23 The Venice Commission decided in March 2010 that the right to freedom of 
religion includes the possibility for religious communities to obtain legal personality.
universities in the southeast were allowed to offer Kurdish degrees and 
Kurdish began to be taught as an elective course in public schools in 
September 2012.
None of these steps, however, have raised hopes for a lasting solution 
like the “Kurdish opening” in July 2009, an initiative launched by the 
AKP government following the March 2009 local elections in which 
the AKP suffered electoral losses to the BDP in the southeast. The first 
and only concrete step in the opening was the return of 34 PKK rebels 
to Turkey in the fall of 2009. The expectation was that the PKK camps in 
Kandil would gradually be evacuated and a political settlement would 
be reached. The first group of 34 unarmed PKK rebels were questioned 
at the border with northern Iraq and then released. They were greeted 
by crowds in the southeast of Turkey. But the government then 
felt pressured to take steps back in view of the massive public and 
opposition outcry against the celebrated reception of the PKK rebels. 
The Kurdish initiative was quickly renamed the “democratic initiative”, 
and later the “unity and fraternity project”, and the rebels initially 
welcomed were soon prosecuted or fled the country. The failure of 
this initiative demonstrated the importance of mobilising broader 
political and societal support and, thus, the need for broad political 
preparation for substantial reforms on the Kurdish issue, the lack of 
which was partly responsible for the collapse of the “opening” and the 
rise in mistrust between the government and the Kurds. The following 
increase in PKK violence stalled progress even further and culminated 
in the closure of the DTP in December 2009, followed by the mounting 
numbers of prosecutions through the KCK operations. In the first 
quarter of 2010, 1483 members of the BDP were prosecuted under 
the KCK trials. By June 2011 general elections, 3200 people (the vast 
majority of whom were members of the BDP) were imprisoned in view 
of their alleged KCK affiliation (Çandar 2012: 81).
The mood only worsened with the 2011 general elections, in which the 
AKP’s electoral strategy relied on adopting a rather conservative and 
nationalist approach to the Kurdish issue and placing the emphasis 
on religious ties and values rather than a rights-based discourse to 
attract Kurdish voters. In choosing to appeal to the Turkish nationalist 
vote and the traditional Islamist streak of Kurdish identity, the Prime 
Minister went so far as to declare that there no longer exists a Kurdish 
issue. The AKP attacked the CHP for its increasingly lenient tone on the 
Kurdish problem, which it presented as part of the party’s allegedly 
larger deal with the BDP. Following the elections, the Supreme Election 
Board decided to strip a BDP candidate of his deputyship on the basis 
of his 2009 conviction for “disseminating PKK propaganda”. In addition, 
the courts declined requests to allow the entry into parliament of 
five more BDP deputies who are jailed as suspects in KCK trials.24 
Nonetheless, the election of 36 BDP members to parliament after the 
elections and the conviction that the AKP would soften its nationalist 
rhetoric after having come to power with a solid majority created 
a brief phase of optimism that soon dissolved when PKK violence 
intensified significantly in the aftermath of the elections, accounting 
for 711 deaths (four times more than in 2009) by August 2012 (ICG 
2012: 1).
The situation started to resemble closely the state of affairs in the 
1990s, when the Kurdish issue marked by intense violence was dealt 
with solely as a security matter and used to restrict fundamental 
freedoms. The limited reform that had been achieved was overcome 
by the reversals in human rights reforms outlined in the previous 
sections, such as in the case of the 2006 amendments to the Anti-
Terror Law, which imposed further restrictions on the fundamental 
freedoms of those who speak for expanded Kurdish rights. The 
State Security Courts entrusted with dealing with crimes against the 
state, which were abolished in 2004, were replaced by “heavy penal 
courts with special powers […] bearing continuity in mandate, rules 
of procedure, judges, personnel, archives and case files” (Kurban and 
Gülalp 2013).25  Although the state of emergency was lifted in 2002, 
24 Two CHP deputies and one MHP deputy also remain under arrest in connection 
with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials respectively.
25 These courts were abolished with the third reform package adopted in July 2012 
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the government has repeatedly authorised the military to declare 
“temporary security zones” in which the military can freely conduct 
its operations (Kurban and Gülalp 2013). The labels have changed but 
developments ominously hark back to the 1990s.
Thus, Turkey continues to suffer from the ongoing low-intensity war 
between the Turkish state and the PKK; from the growing risk of 
becoming an ethnically-divided, polarised, and conflict-prone society; 
as well as from the enduring dominance of the language of security 
and conflict over that of democracy and liberty. The resolution of this 
impasse calls for the implementation of a comprehensive strategy 
aimed at a durable political solution entailing constitutional and 
legal reforms together with their full implementation, as well as 
intense societal deliberation to win a critical mass of support for the 
initiatives to be taken. The basis of this strategy should be sought 
in a multicultural and differentiated understanding of citizenship as 
a constitutive norm of “living together in diversity”. This would then 
make it possible to seek a feasible and effective solution to the Kurdish 
question, not in ethnic terms, but by exploring possible ways of 
articulating identity-claims to citizenship rights “with an emphasis on 
the practice of democracy” (Işın and Wood 1999: 4; Keyman 2012). This 
would also imply an enlarged understanding of citizenship including 
not only individual and group rights but also its “denationalisation” 
(Benhabib 2004: 14).
Locating the Kurdish question in the domain of equal citizenship 
without ignoring its “Kurdishness” enables one to rethink one’s loyalties 
and belonging not only in terms of identity and community, but also 
of the rule of law and constitutionalism. The call for citizenship should 
thus not only be post-national and differential, meaning that it should 
not be reduced to legal and political membership in the nation-state 
and recognition of cultural as well as individual rights; but that it 
should also be constitutional in the sense that it should function as 
a common ground for the constitutional guarantee and protection 
of both individual and group rights (Keyman 2012). This is why the 
preparation of the new constitution is of the utmost importance in 
solving the Kurdish question democratically through the idea of equal 
citizenship. 
The new constitution should thus not contain any references to an 
ethnic, religious or sectarian identity and include a comprehensive 
definition of citizenship that does not rest on any identity or class. 
It should have provisions that strengthen the role and autonomy of 
local government within the framework of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government;26  lift the restrictions on education in mother-
tongue on the basis of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (which still has to be signed by Turkey); contain a section 
on cultural rights; include an article that guarantees protection 
against discrimination; and introduce measures that would make it 
more difficult to close down political parties in line with the Venice 
Commission guidelines (see the section on the Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and Association).27  In addition to these and as highlighted in 
our previous paper, the constitutional endorsement of the principle of 
multiculturalism would reflect a legal commitment to the preservation 
of Turkey’s cultural heritage. Thus when interpreting and enforcing 
the constitution and laws, judicial, legislative and executive officials 
would be required to consider the preservation and enhancement 
of the cultural heritages of all minorities in Turkey (Kurban 2003). 
Constitutional reform along these lines would help to create a new 
social contract between state and society/individual citizens, as well 
as within society. This would take place through the transformation of 
a republican and duty-based citizenship privileging state power over 
individual rights and freedoms into a democratic and multicultural 
citizenship based on enlarged rights and freedoms.
and replaced by Anti-Terror Courts.
26 Whereby Turkey’s restrictions on some of its clauses would have to be lifted.
27 These constitutional demands of the Kurdish minority have long been voiced by 
some prominent think-tanks and civil society organisations in Turkey (Kurban and 
Ensaroğlu 2010: 24-32; Özbudun and Tarhanlı 2011: 27-29).
Constitutional reform would have to be coupled with a comprehensive 
reform of the accompanying laws such as the Political Parties Law, the 
Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. As outlined in the earlier sections, 
the current state of these laws substantially hinders fundamental 
rights and freedoms under the banner of the fight against terror. An 
overall strategy of democratic consolidation that entails the resolution 
of the Kurdish issue also necessitates proper implementation of the 
reformed laws, which in turn requires intensive training both during 
the education and the careers of the members of the bureaucracy and 
the judiciary. 
These legal efforts should be combined with the lifting of indirect 
restrictions on political representation in parliament, namely the 
electoral system. The current 10 percent threshold in parliamentary 
elections stands as a big obstacle for democratic representation of 
various political currents in parliament. All previous proposals to lower 
the threshold have been declined on the basis of maintaining political 
and economic stability. Nonetheless, a recent study by the Economic 
Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV 2011) shows that both 
stability and fair representation can be achieved with a 4 percent 
threshold. Furthermore, since 2007, Kurdish nationalist parties, with 
a support base of approximately 5 to 6 percent of the national vote, 
have chosen to nominate their candidates as independents in those 
provinces where they have a substantial electoral base. The success 
of this strategy has demonstrated the obsolescence of the 10 percent 
threshold.
Resolution of the Kurdish issue also requires the adoption of new 
economic and social measures in the eastern and southeastern 
region including, but not limited to, the development of a long-term 
special incentive system that is specific to the region, intensification 
of infrastructural projects most notably in the energy and transport 
sectors, investments geared towards employment, vocational training 
for the employment of unqualified labour force, direct income 
transfers, and an action plan on education that entails measures 
for sustaining attendance in schools and resolving the shortage in 
teachers (Kurmuş et al. 2006). In line with the constitutional reform, 
opportunities for greater self-governance at the local level can be 
fostered by new measures such as the establishment of provincial 
administrations comprising a few provinces and a certain degree 
of transfer of competences and resources from the centre to these 
bodies in the fields of education and health. Restrictions on the use 
of languages besides Turkish in local administrations and in courts 
should be lifted. These measures may not only prove effective towards 
the resolution of the Kurdish issue, but also help to promote better 
governance at the national level. 
The failure of the Kurdish opening has forcefully shown that the 
success of these reforms are closely tied to an intense societal 
deliberation in which the government needs to convince the Turks of 
the necessity, viability and timing of a political solution based on equal 
citizenship and non-discrimination. At the same time, it has to gain the 
trust of the Kurds on its sincere commitment to reform. In reaching 
out to the Turkish majority, the government needs to underline that 
despite the rising impasse, recent polls suggest that only 6 percent of 
the Kurds have separatist ambitions (Milliyet 2012a). The limited public 
reaction to current controversial events also shows that the political 
risks associated with such reforms may not be too high and that there 
may be grounds for hope in fostering societal support on this front. For 
instance, the leaked tapes of the government’s negotiations with the 
PKK, also known as the “Oslo process”, did not trigger a major backlash 
among the public. In a similar vein, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent 
Arınç’s statements on the possibility of moving Öcalan to house arrest 
after a resolution of the conflict did not lead to a harsh public reaction 
(ICG 2012: 5). These show that even if the desired end has not yet been 
achieved, the democratic and public deliberations and discussion of 
the Kurdish question have nevertheless become the accepted norm 
in Turkey. 
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The judicial system
The state of the Turkish justice system is central to determining the 
fate of Turkey’s efforts at democratic consolidation. In its current form, 
it poses a major hindrance to the reform process with its institutional, 
societal and ideological dimensions. About 32 percent of all the ECtHR 
judgements against Turkey in the period 1995-2010 concerned the 
right to a fair trial, while 23 percent related to the right of personal 
liberty and security (ECtHR 2010: 157). Judicial independence is 
impaired by institutional links with the executive and the resilient 
allegiance of the judiciary to the state rather than the individual and 
society. Societal trust in the judiciary and in the law’s capacity to solve 
problems is also low. A study conducted in 2008 revealed that only 41 
per cent of the population believed that individuals are treated fairly 
by the courts (Kalem, Galma and Elveriş 2008: 15).
Since 1999, Turkey has undertaken important legislative reforms 
regarding its judicial system and has made considerable efforts 
towards the training of its judges. The 1999-2005 amendments covered 
some of the judicial reforms long demanded by the EU, including the 
abolition of the infamous State Security Courts that used to deal with 
crimes against the state, allowing retrial in civil and criminal cases in 
which the ECtHR had found violations of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, and ending the jurisdiction of military courts over 
civilians. Reforms on this front were then suspended, however, until 
the constitutional reform package was approved by 58 percent of the 
electorate in the September 2010 constitutional referendum. 
The government, especially during its second term, had conflictual 
relations with the largely oppositional Kemalist judiciary, culminating 
in the closure case against the AKP in March 2008. In August 2009, 
the government announced the Judicial Reform Strategy (later 
revised in September 2012) and put its main provisions to the vote 
in the 2010 referendum. The constitutional reform package addressed 
some key priorities of the Accession Partnership Document in 
the area of the judiciary, such as further restricting the authority of 
military courts, allowing judicial appeals against expulsion decisions 
of the Supreme Military Council, introducing individual applications 
to the Constitutional Court and changing the composition of the 
Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. 
These, and other reforms introduced by the reform package were 
in general received positively by the EU, while they have been 
strongly contested within Turkey. For an overview on constitutional 
amendments in judicial reform between 1982 and 2012, see Figure 3 
(in the Annex).
Much of the dispute concentrated on two amendments that concern 
the composition of the Constitutional Court and the High Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the latter of which determines 
the career paths of judges and prosecutors through appointments, 
transfers, promotions, reprimands and other mechanisms. While these 
amendments aimed to democratise the judiciary and make it more 
responsive to the demands of society by diversifying the background 
of the members of the Constitutional Court and by widening the 
composition of the High Council, they were criticised for retaining 
certain provisions that compromise judicial independence (see 
below).
Legal reform with respect to the judicial system continued with 
consecutive reform packages that were mainly geared towards 
decreasing the workload of the judiciary and increasing the efficiency 
of the justice system. The first and the second judicial reform packages 
passed in 2011 included measures such as decriminalising certain 
offences which are now subject to administrative fines, introducing 
legal fees for applicants to Regional Courts of Appeal and to the Court 
of Cassation and transferring powers of issuing inheritance certificates 
from courts to public notaries (Turkish Ministry of Justice 2012: 43). The 
Laws on the Court of Cassation and the Council of State were amended 
to decrease their current backlog by establishing more chambers, 
changing their working methods and appointing a large number of 
judges and prosecutors to these courts (European Commission 2011: 
17). In the case of the Court of Cassation, these measures have already 
started to yield an improvement with its caseload of 1.12 million in July 
2011 going down to 0.88 million in July 2012 (European Commission 
2011: 14-15).
The third reform package passed in July 2012 abolished the much 
criticised heavy penal courts with special powers and replaced them 
with Anti-Terror Courts, which include specialised judges who are 
responsible solely for deciding on preventive measures during the 
investigation phase and who do not take part in the actual trial. This 
package has also introduced other measures to tackle the problem 
of undue and long pre-trial detention periods that have been widely 
criticised by the EU and the CoE, by lifting the three year limit for 
judicial control, introducing new measures of judicial control as an 
alternative to pre-trial detention and by amending Article 101 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code which now provides that pre-trial detention 
can only be introduced and sustained when there is a strong suspicion 
that the crime has been committed, that there are grounds for arrest 
and that the proportionality of arrest is explicitly documented and 
justified through the presentation of concrete evidence. 
Box 4. Selected post-2005 reforms of the judicial system
» The 2010 constitutional amendments increased the number of members 
of the Constitutional Court from 11 to 17 (where 4 are now elected by the 
Parliament instead of the President) and reduced their tenure from 25 to 
12 years.
» The 2010 constitutional amendments increased the number of 
members of the High Council from 7 to 22 and widened its composition 
from representatives of the High Courts to legal scholars, lawyers and 
representatives of the low courts, elected mostly by the judiciary itself. 
They also established a Secretariat for the High Council separate from the 
Ministry of Justice.
» The amendments to the Constitution opened to judicial review decisions 
by the High Council dismissing members of the judiciary from the 
profession. Judicial inspectors responsible for evaluating the performance 
of judges and prosecutors now report to the High Council and no longer to 
the Ministry of Justice, to prevent political influence through the Ministry.
» The first and second judicial reform packages adopted in 2011 included 
measures such as decriminalising certain offences which are now subject 
to administrative fines, introducing legal fees for applicants to Regional 
Courts of Appeal and to the Court of Cassation and transferring powers of 
issuing inheritance certificates from courts to public notaries.
» A Law on Mediation that is expected to decrease the workload of the 
judiciary entered into force in June 2012.
» The third judicial reform package of 2012 abolished heavy penal courts 
with special powers and eradicated the rights of the courts to put time 
limits on defendants and prosecutors in the context of judicial processes; 
to expel the accused or the defence from any or all future hearings on the 
grounds of behaviour deemed to disturb court order and discipline; to limit 
to one the number of defence lawyers while the suspect’s statement is 
being taken or during custody.
» In tackling the problem of long pre-trial detention periods, the third 
reform package lifted the three-year limit for judicial control, introduced 
new forms of judicial control and amended Article 101 of the Criminal 
Procedure to strengthen the obligation of giving reasoned opinions in the 
courts’ decision for pre-trial detention.
In addition to these legal measures, there has also been considerable 
progress relating to the training of the members of the judiciary, as 
well as to the technological infrastructure of the justice system. In 
2011, 2941 judges and public prosecutors received intensive in-
service training including on human rights related issues (Turkish High 
Council for Judges and Prosecutors 2012: 83). Regarding technological 
progress, the EU-assisted National Judicial Network Project initiated 
in 2001 has turned the Turkish justice system into one of the most 
computerized judiciaries in Europe (Council of Europe 2010: 92-97). This 
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has significantly helped to ease citizens’ access to justice and improve 
the efficiency and transparency of judicial services by accelerating 
administrative procedures (Van Delden 2009: 11). A study conducted 
by the Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency 
of Justice (CEPEJ) attributed this to the successful combination 
of the “reform of codes, procedures, structure, organization [and] 
composition” with reforms related to Information and Communication 
Technology (Velicogna 2007: 15).
Despite all these steps taken, there is general agreement that reforms 
in this area have not delivered the expected results and that the main 
problems facing the Turkish judicial system remain largely intact. As 
we did in our 2004 paper, we classify the remaining problems with 
the Turkish judicial system under three broad categories: excessive 
workload, insufficient independence, and lack of impartiality. 
Regarding excessive workload, the 2010 CEPEJ data shows us that 
despite the increase in the number of judges in recent years, the 
number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants in Turkey is 10.6, still below 
the 21.3 average for CoE members (Council of Europe 2012a: 145). A 
judge in Turkey currently faces an average number of 1078 cases each 
year compared to an average number of 200 cases faced annually 
by the judges of EU member states (Public Expenditures Monitoring 
Platform 2012: 20). This largely contributes to excessively long judicial 
proceedings and huge backlogs in the system. Turkey was the country 
with the highest number of violations of Article 6 of the ECHR on the 
“reasonable time” of judicial proceedings in 2010 (Council of Europe 
2012a: 172). The problem of workload becomes particularly acute in 
the case of the High Courts. For instance, the backlog of the Court 
of Cassation increased twelvefold between 2000 and 2011.28  Another 
demonstration of the current workload of the judiciary is the fact that 
approximately 50 percent of all cases result in acquittals, whereas the 
EU average for acquittals are estimated to amount to 6 percent of all 
cases (Istanbul Policy Centre 2012: 41).
One way of dealing with this problem is to increase the number of 
judges and prosecutors, which the government has been trying 
to do in recent years. Nonetheless, this measure alone seems to be 
insufficient in effectively tackling the problem of excessive workload. 
It is also important that intermediate courts of appeal, the legal 
framework of which was already established in 2005, start functioning 
with no further delay. With a few exceptions, all decisions of the general 
courts can be appealed to the Court of Cassation, which results in its 
currently enormous backlog of cases that would otherwise be dealt 
with by courts of appeal. The courts of appeal are expected to increase 
the speed and efficiency of the judiciary and constitute an important 
step in ensuring the right to a fair trial. They can also allow the Court 
of Cassation to concentrate on its function of unifying and clarifying 
Turkish case law. 
Another challenge concerning workload is the fact that prosecutors 
do not fulfill their “gate-keeping function” and tend to bring a high 
number of unmeritorious cases to court. This is partly due to their fear of 
judicial inspectors, particularly when cases concern the security of the 
state. On top of this, they do not always have the necessary resources 
to conduct high-quality pre-trial investigations and have to rely on 
ordinary police or gendarmerie officers under their supervision who 
lack specialised competences in judicial matters. In this respect, the 
establishment of a separate judicial police organisation may result in 
higher quality investigations and shorter trial periods. Other measures 
to decrease the workload, such as introducing reasonable time limits 
for the gathering of evidence and the presentation of indictments 
to courts, ensuring that trials continue with fewer interruptions and 
establishing a separate authority to exercise supervisory jurisdiction 
over courts to accelerate proceedings could also be adopted (Council 
of Europe 2012b: para. 15-26).
Substantial improvements in the independence of the judiciary have 
28 Statistics pertaining to the Court of Cassation are available at http://www.yargitay.
gov.tr/index2.php?pgid=21.
been made through the 2010 constitutional referendum that changed 
the powers and the composition of the High Council considerably. 
The constitutional amendments increased the number of its members 
from 7 to 22, which was largely necessary given the size of the Turkish 
judiciary; established a High Council secretariat separate from the 
Ministry of Justice; and widened its composition from representatives 
of the High Courts to legal scholars, lawyers and representatives of the 
low courts, elected mostly by the judiciary itself. This created a Council 
that is much more representative of the judicial sphere than the 
previous one. The fact that judges and prosecutors are now evaluated 
by inspectors appointed by the Council and not by the Ministry as 
before has remedied an important source of judicial dependence on 
the executive, which was much criticised in the past by the EU and 
scholars alike. 
Nevertheless, despite these developments, there is still considerable 
cause for concern regarding the independence of the judiciary in 
Turkey. One crucial element of the 1982 constitution concerned 
the presence of the Minister of Justice in the High Council. The new 
constitutional amendments abolish the right of the Minister to 
attend the meetings. Yet, he still has the task of “representing” and 
“administering” the Council, can still decide on the Secretary General, 
must still approve inspections against judges and prosecutors and his 
Undersecretary is still present in the Council meetings. While for some 
observers the current presence of the Minister and his Undersecretary 
are rather symbolic in nature and thus does not have a bearing on 
judicial independence, there is a wider consensus that the voting 
system used to determine the members of the High Council is 
problematic. Under the system established after the referendum, each 
judge and prosecutor has the right to elect ten (out of 22) High Council 
members by voting for each post to be filled rather than voting for 
only one representative. The Venice Commission had already warned 
in its interim opinion on the draft law on the High Council that this 
system would entail “the possibility of informal electoral majority 
agreements aimed at avoiding the election of candidates who are 
the expression of minority orientations, which should, in any case, be 
present in the body if the HSYK is to be representative of the entire 
judiciary” (Council of Europe Venice Commission 2010: para. 37). In 
fact, the first elections to the High Council under the new rules were 
tarnished by the election of all the names in a list allegedly prepared 
by the government (Ergin 2010; İnsel 2010).
Hence it is important that the voting rules to the High Council be 
changed to increase the representativeness of the institution and to 
strengthen its independence from the executive. The transparency 
of the High Council’s decisions would also be enhanced by annual 
reports that communicate its decisions to society (Istanbul Policy 
Centre 2012: 35-36). While the transfer of the powers of inspection 
and supervision of judges and prosecutors from the Ministry to the 
Council under the new rules is welcome, the fact that the Minister has 
to authorise investigations by virtue of Article 159 of the Constitution 
compromises judicial independence; as a result, this veto right should 
be revoked (Council of Europe 2012b: para. 108). Strengthening judicial 
independence also requires that all of the decisions of the High Council 
should be subject to judicial review and that the criteria relating to 
the inspection, performance appraisals, disciplining and dismissal of 
judges and prosecutors need to be more “precisely” and “narrowly” 
defined (Giegerich 2011: 26-28). The new constitution should also 
more precisely define the derogations to judicial guarantees in line 
with the Siracusa Principles29  and clearly state “geographic guarantees”, 
among others, against the use of geographic reassignment as an 
arbitrary source of punishment for judges and prosecutors (Istanbul 
Policy Centre 2012: 33-34).
Limitations to judicial independence, however, are not restricted to 
matters concerning the High Council, but are also observed at the 
29 Siracusa Principles (also known as the Draft Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary) were formulated by a committee of experts organised by the International 
Association of Penal Law, the International Commission of Jurists and the Centre for 
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in May 1981. Text is available at http://
cristidanilet.ro/docs/Siracusa%20Principles.pdf.
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point of entry into the judicial profession, where the Ministry of Justice 
is strongly involved. The Justice Academy at which the candidate 
judges and prosecutors receive their pre-service training is run by 
a general assembly whose members include the Minister and his 
Undersecretary. The written exams taken upon completion of the two 
year pre-service training are followed by an oral exam conducted by 
a board that is composed of five members from the Ministry and two 
from the Justice Academy. Hence to ensure full independence at entry 
level, the Justice Academy’s autonomy from the executive should 
be guaranteed and recruitment should be performed solely by the 
reformed Justice Academy.
While a judiciary fully independent from the executive or any other 
external locus of power is essential for a consolidated democracy, it 
may not be sufficient in attaining impartiality among the cadres of 
the judiciary. As Özbudun highlights, “achieving impartiality of the 
judiciary is much more difficult than achieving independence since 
independence is an institutional matter whereas impartiality is a 
psychological disposition […] even if a judge is fully independent vis-
à-vis the legislative and the executive, he can be susceptible to certain 
ideological pressures and relations of interest” (Özbudun 2007).
In the Turkish judicial system, both judicial independence and 
impartiality are compromised by the relationship between judges 
and prosecutors. As also highlighted in our 2004 paper, judges 
and prosecutors continue to take the same exams to enter their 
professions, have their careers determined by the High Council, 
attend the same school for pre-service training, earn the same salaries 
throughout their careers and even live in the same residences. Even 
in courts, certain symbolic actions such as entering the court through 
the same doors and sitting side by side on an elevated platform 
reinforce the link between the two. Such symbolic actions also distort 
the balance between the prosecution and the defence, as lawyers 
use different doors to enter the court, sit at a table below the judges 
and prosecutors at the ground level and remain in court when the 
prosecutors retire with the judges to the same chamber during the 
course of the proceedings. Hence, legal, institutional and functional 
linkages between the judges and the office of the prosecutor 
(including the existence of a single, common High Council for both) 
should be abolished in order to achieve the full independence and 
impartiality of judges, and defence and prosecution should be placed 
in equal positions. Reform on this front is particularly necessary 
considering that “the prosecutors’ symbolically privileged standing in 
criminal proceedings, as the guardian of state interests, could reinforce 
the perception according to which the Turkish judicial system has a 
strong in-built bias for the interests of the state and projects an 
appearance of partiality to defendants and to the public” (Council of 
Europe 2012b: para. 123).
Indeed, previous sections detailing the current state of the reform 
process in various areas demonstrate this “strong built-in bias” and 
the way in which it leads to inconsistent interpretation of the law 
and impedes political reform. While there is a need to refine certain 
laws to make them less vague and less open to interpretation, this 
is insufficient. Previous research suggests that there is an even more 
pressing need for a change in the mentality of judges and prosecutors 
who often consider their first and foremost job to protect the interests 
of the state rather than individual rights and freedoms and to grant a fair 
trial (Sancar and Ümit Atılgan 2011). State sensitivities as the dominant 
ideology is in-built from the very early stages of the careers of judges 
and prosecutors who, when serving in small provinces, socialise mainly 
with the other members of the provincial bureaucracy and are under 
both peer and societal pressure to act as a “representative of the state” 
(Sancar and Ümit Atılgan 2011: 14-16).
This is reinforced by the system of appraisals, which engender a 
widespread fear among both prosecutors and judges that “not 
considering the necessary balances” (that is, between state interests 
and justice) in their investigations and decisions can result in 
punishment such as involuntary transfers. 
The crucial issue here is to change the mindsets of the judges 
and prosecutors, not only to attain interpretations that expand 
fundamental rights and freedoms, but also to ensure they take 
allegations of human rights abuses seriously. The most important tool 
to achieve this end is primarily the education system itself. Although 
there have been certain improvements in legal education in the recent 
years, legal training in most universities is still far from satisfactory with 
over-crowded faculties relying excessively on simple memorising 
rather than analytical reasoning. This calls for a more comprehensive 
reform of education laws with a heavy emphasis on human rights 
education, inspired by practices in other European countries. Similarly, 
the training of candidate judges and prosecutors should also be 
reformed in such a way that they have significant experience before 
starting the profession. In-service training on matters such as EU law 
and international human rights law also needs to be continued in an 
intensive and systematic fashion and to reach out to a wide segment 
of the judiciary. These efforts at education need to be coupled with 
a comprehensive reform of the system of inspection and appraisals 
of judges’ and prosecutors’ performance where, as argued earlier, the 
criteria for career related decisions are more clearly and narrowly spelt 
out, and thus can act as “natural incentives for judges and prosecutors 
towards effectively embedding the ECHR and the case-law of the 
ECtHR into their daily work” (Council of Europe 2012b: para. 161).
The prime embodiment in the Turkish justice system of judicial 
partiality toward the state were the State Security Courts and later the 
heavy penal courts with special powers, which were both associated 
with upholding state interests over those of the individual in the name 
of “securing the state”. Although the third reform package has recently 
replaced the heavy penal courts with Anti-Terror Courts and has 
introduced improvements in the rights of the defence, the problem of 
entrenched mindsets is difficult to eradicate in the short run and may 
continue to impede the rule of law. Hence it is also important for the 
sake of impartiality that all kinds of special courts be abolished in the 
Turkish justice system.
Conclusion
This report shows that the current stagnation of Turkish democracy 
goes hand in hand with the current impasse in EU-Turkey relations. 
Domestic factors have combined with a loss of credibility of EU 
conditionality to create a situation in which political reform is 
substantially stalled and, in the cases in which it has continued, has 
mostly served the interests of the ruling political elite, with no particular 
reference to the EU. The virtuous cycle of reform that characterised the 
1999-2005 period has been replaced by a vicious cycle in which lack 
of conditionality feeds into political stagnation which in turn moves 
Turkey and the EU further away from one another. 
The post-2005 trajectory of democratic reform in Turkey hence 
demonstrates that the EU is still a fundamental anchor in the 
consolidation of Turkish democracy. It is an external anchor needed to 
keep the country on the path to democracy and stability, to ensure that 
Turkey pursues a consistent path of reform with a view to joining the EU 
and to provide solutions to the immediate and pressing problems facing 
Turkish politics and society. The presence of an EU anchor on the path to 
democracy and stability would mean minimising the risk of substantial 
reversals to the reform process, as observed in the recent debates 
initiated by Prime Minister Erdoğan on the merits of reintroducing the 
death penalty. Pursuing a consistent path of reform with a view to EU 
accession would entail undertaking systematic reforms rather than ad 
hoc steps (as in the case of the judicial system) which strengthen the 
perception that only those reforms that empower the ruling political 
elite are undertaken. Resorting to a strong EU anchor in searching for 
answers to key political challenges would help to weaken the forces 
opposed to reform in society who act as stumbling blocks in the 
resolution of key political conflicts such as the Kurdish issue.
In spite of the importance of this anchor, the future prospects for 
Turkey-EU relations seem to be mired on the EU side by the euro crisis, 
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short-term political calculations of political leaders and the dominant 
exclusionary rhetoric towards Turkey, and on the Turkish side by the 
shift in interest among the political parties and in society at large 
from Turkish membership in the EU towards a more active global and 
regional role for Turkey. A lack of vision, trust and commitment on both 
sides seems to have brought relations to a standstill. To overcome this 
impasse, both short- and long-term measures need to be envisaged. 
In the shorter run, the recommendations put forward in 2011 by the 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan 
Füle, are noteworthy. They include enhanced cooperation between 
Turkey and the EU on political reform, continued attempts on the part 
of Turkey to bring its legislation into closer alignment with the EU, 
maximising the potential benefits of economic relations between the 
two sides, a stronger dialogue on foreign policy in the light of the Arab 
Spring and visa facilitation (Füle 2011). Nonetheless, reinvigorating 
relations and building them on more solid grounds where the EU can 
act as a long-term anchor for Turkish democracy requires a debate 
that is based on a stronger commitment and a broader vision. This 
may necessitate a reconceptualisation of Turkey-EU relations from the 
perspective of mutual benefits in a globalised world, where debates 
on more flexible modes of membership are not excluded. While this 
could prove to be crucial for the fate of Turkish democracy, the demand 
for democracy in the southern neighbourhood, where Turkey and its 
relations with the EU are closely watched, extends the importance of 
this democratic journey and the role the EU plays in it beyond Turkey.
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Annex
• Figure 1 | Public support for EU accession in Turkey (2004-2011)
Public Support for EU Accession in Turkey, 2004-2011
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• Figure 2 | Number of applications from Turkey to the EctHR* (2005-2011) 
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• Figure 3 | Constitutional amendments in judicial reform (1982-2012)
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